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Abstract 
The deteriorating human rights situations in Myanmar and Zimbabwe have drawn concerns from 
the international community. Mainly Western states and NGOs have criticised both governments 
and urged strong action from the regional organisations, namely ASEAN and SADC. However, 
because of the deeply rooted non-intervention norm in these regions, Southeast Asia and 
Southern Africa, the human rights situation in both states long remained serious. Recently 
however, ASEAN has taken up a strong stance towards Myanmar. On the contrary, SADC has 
showed reluctance to respond to the human rights violations in Zimbabwe. The question arises 
why these two regional organisations have showed different responses? In other words, the 
ASEAN member states have become relaxed and accepted the new human rights norm, 
discarding the traditional non-intervention norm, while the SADC member states still stick to the 
norm of non-intervention. 
In order to find answers, the focus in this thesis is on the process of socialisation which means 
that the actors adopt new norms which are also accepted by society as a whole. Three 
mechanisms which lead to socialisation, namely strategic calculation, role-playing and normative 
suasion, are discussed. The conclusion reached is that regional organisation can play a role in 
inducing the member states to accept the new norm, in the process the regional organisation is 
also socialised through interaction with other international organisations and actors.  
Here, historical background, and particularly the process of gaining independence in SADC 
heavily influenced the socialisation process in this region. SADC member states‘ liberation 
struggle against colonialism and apartheid led to the formation of strong bonds among member 
states that has made it difficult for respective state leaders to criticise each other. Such strong 
bonds do not exist in Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, member states interact actively with 
external actors such as the EU and NGOs. Thus they become receptive to human rights norms; in 
turn, the regional organisation itself has been socialised and has become relaxed enough to 
discard the non-intervention norm. Also an increasingly large middle class has become interested 
in the human rights situation in its neighbouring countries. These are the factors which have led 
to the differing responses from ASEAN and SADC to human rights abuses in their regions.  
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Opsomming 
Nadat hulle onafhanklikheid gekry het, het die menseregte situasie in Myanmar en Zimbabwe 
agteruitgegaan. Die internasionale gemeenskap, meestal Westerse state en nie-regerings 
organisasies het albei regerings gekritiseer en die streeksorganisasies, naamlik ASEAN en 
SADC, dringend versoek om streng op te tree. Weens die diep-gewortelde nie-intervensie norm 
in beide Suidoos-Asië en Suider-Afrika het die menseregte situasie egter lank ernstig gebly. 
ASEAN het egter meer onlangs sterk standpunt ingeneem teenoor Myanmar. Maar SADC is nog 
steeds onwillig om te reageer op die menseregte vergrype in Zimbabwe. Die vraag is nou 
waarom hierdie twee streeksorganisasies so verskillend opgetree het. Die lidstate van ASEAN 
het ontspanne geraak en die nuwe menseregte norme aanvaar en die tradisionele nie-intervensie 
norm laat vaar, terwyl SADC lidstate nog hou by die nie-intervensie norm . 
In die soek na antwoorde, is die fokus van hierdie tesis op die proses van sosialisering wat 
beteken dat die akteurs nuwe norme wat deur die internasionale gemeenskap as geheel aanvaar 
word, aanneem. Die drie meganismes wat lei tot sosialisering, naamlik strategiese berekening, 
rol-speling en normatiewe oorreding, word bespreek. Die slotsom waartoe gekom word is dat 
streeksorganisasies ‘n rol kan speel in die oorreding van lidstate om die nuwe norm te aanvaar en 
dat die streeksorganisasies in die proses deur interaksie met ander internasionale organisasies en 
akteurs,  self gesosialiseer word.  
Historiese agtergrond en veral die proses waardeur onafhanklikheid in die lande van Suider-
Afrika verkry is, het die sosialisasie proses in die area beïnvloed. SADC lidstate se vryheidstryd 
teen kolonialisme en apartheid het sterk bande tussen lidstate gesmee en dit moeilik gemaak vir 
die leiers van die state om mekaar te kritiseer. Daar bestaan nie sulke sterk bande in Suidoos-
Asië nie. Verder is daar in Suidoos-Asië aktiewe interaksie met ander organisasies soos die 
Europese Unie en met nie-regerings organisasies. Dus is hulle meer ontvanklik vir menseregte 
norms. Op hulle beurt is die streeksorganisasies ook gesosialiseer en het hulle ontspanne genoeg 
geraak om af te sien van die nie-intervensie norm. Die groeiende middelklas het ook 
geïnteresseerd geraak in die menseregte situasie in hulle eie en in die buurlande. Dit is die 
faktore wat gelei het tot die verskillende reaksies van ASEAN en SADC tot die menseregte 
vergrype in hulle onderskeie streke.   
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1. Introduction  
1-1. Background to the Study 
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the Second World War in 1948 
is considered as one of milestones of human rights history. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights recognised human rights as ―the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family‖ (Donnelly, 1999:80). Since then, the declaration has been 
regarded as universal. However, in reality, it is not accepted universally. Various forms of human 
rights violations still occur in many regions such as in Asia and Africa. Mainly non-Western 
countries resist this norm, claiming that it is Western-centric.
1
 This claim is based on the belief 
that ―different societies have different bodies of beliefs and practices‖, and that therefore there is 
no way that one society can judge another (Parekh, 1999:133).
2
 This so-called ―cultural 
relativist‖ approach conflicts with the universalism of human rights. 3 One criticism brought 
against the human rights norm is that it is based on a ―hegemonic‖, that is, liberal Western 
model. Sometimes, it is stated that the West judges other societies by their standards and in terms 
of ―the imperial civilising mission‖ (Parekh, 1999:133).  
However, Parekh (1999:122) argues that ―an outsider‘s judgement of another society‘s 
interpretation of universal values is strengthened if there is internal criticism of the justifications 
which its own government puts forward‖. In other words, cultural relativism loses its validity if 
there is criticism from inside the country or cultural group which belongs to the same 
civilisation. Considering that there has been criticism within Asian and African countries 
                                                          
1
 It is often alleged by non-Western states that Western states use intervention as an excuse to achieve strategic and 
economic ends in the state where human rights violations occurred (Narine, 2005:472). 
2
 For example, in the African context, African societies were characterised as significantly different from the West 
in their political systems. However, despite their hierarchical structure, traditional political systems were generally 
governed by broad participation through group representation. This element can be compatible with the principle of 
democracy based on Western experience (Deng, 2009:30-32). Therefore, what is important is not whether the 
political structure or cultural practice is Western or non-Western, what is important is that human rights principles 
should be rooted in the quest for human dignity. In this research, anything that conflicts with this human dignity will 
be regarded as a human rights violation. 
3
 According to Parekh (1999:128), the relativists‘ view is that ―different societies throw up different systems of 
moral beliefs‖ and that these are based on their own ―history, traditions and geographical circumstances,‖ amongst 
others. For example, the universalism of human rights prioritizes the protection of the individual whereas most non-
Western countries emphasize community rather than the individual. 
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regarding their neighbouring countries‘ human rights situations, the claim that different societies 
have different ways of dealing with human rights loses ground. The international community, 
and in its narrowest sense the regional community, should exercise their collective actions to 
solve the problems.  
Against this backdrop, the focus of this research will be on interventions that took place in 
Southeast Asia and Southern Africa with regard to human rights abuses in Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe. First of all, in Southeast Asia, Myanmar is notorious for its continual human rights 
violations.
4
 The human rights violations in Myanmar have their roots in ethnic insurgences and 
military regimes. Also, economic deterioration has resulted in protests, and these have 
transformed into political or anti-governmental demonstrations. In response, Myanmar‘s military 
regime brutally suppressed anti-government demonstrations. Myanmar drew especially harsh 
international condemnation in September 2007 when Myanmar‘s democracy activists, monks 
and ordinary people took to the streets of Yangon peacefully against their autocratic rulers and 
the Myanmar government oppressed the peaceful protest. It was reported that 13 people were 
killed at that time, while the United Nations Human Rights Council said that the death toll was 
more than what the government had reported (―Myanmar, UN Human Rights Chief Calls for 
Release of Peaceful Demonstrators‖, 2007).  
The international community responded immediately after the crackdown, held a public hearing, 
and issued statements expressing its concern. Members of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) also strongly criticised the Myanmarese government, expressing their 
revulsion over the military regime‘s crackdown.5 This collective action taken by ASEAN and its 
member states implies that the existing non-intervention norm which was deeply embedded in 
this region has changed. Before this, ASEAN‘s non-intervention norm was criticised as it had 
discouraged member states from criticising or intervening in other members‘ internal affairs 
                                                          
4
 The junta changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. The capital city, Rangoon also 
became Yangon. Other geographic locations also adopted English names. This change was recognised by the United 
Nations (UN), ASEAN and by countries such as France and Japan, but not by the US and the UK. Also, democratic 
movements prefer the name Burma because they do not accept the legitimacy of the military regime or its right to 
change the official name of the country (―Should it be Burma or Myanmar?‖, 2007). This thesis follows the UN and 
ASEAN‘s recognition, so the name, Myanmar will be used. 
5
 Current ASEAN member states are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. East Timor will become a member of ASEAN by 2011 (ASEAN, 
2010). 
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(Katanyuu, 2006:826). However, at the 13th Summit of ASEAN in Singapore in 2007, ASEAN 
leaders agreed to adopt the ASEAN Charter. The Charter called for the establishment of an 
ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB) as a new organ of ASEAN, and in 2009, the AHRB was 
established (Hao Duy Phan, 2009:469). Given ASEAN‘s past reluctance to make progress on the 
issue of human rights, the fact that member states discussed the promotion of human rights, and 
the establishment of the AHRB was a remarkable development in ASEAN‘s history (McCarthy, 
2009:158).  
In the case of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe has also experienced a serious human rights crisis. 
Amnesty International has documented many cases of political oppression by the dominant 
party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), such as unlawful killings, 
torture and the harassment mainly of supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). Since 2000, during the presidential and parliamentary elections, the violations 
were reported to have reached a peak. It is alleged that President Robert Mugabe employed 
repressive measures to cling to power. In addition to this, the economic collapse of Zimbabwe 
meant that people‘s basic needs such as the need for food, healthcare and education were not 
being met. At the time of independence, Zimbabwe was considered the ―bread basket‖ of 
Southern Africa, however, the economic system collapsed within a few decades.  
In response to the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, Western states and international human 
rights NGOs such as Amnesty International urged African governments to put pressure on 
Zimbabwe regarding human rights violations. They urged the regional organisation, the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) to do the same at the 
continental level.
6
 SADC member states discussed the human rights situation in Zimbabwe at 
annual meetings and extraordinary summits. The aim of these series of meetings was to provide 
SADC member states with an opportunity to take action on the political and human rights crisis 
in Zimbabwe. However, there was no specific outcome which addressed the improvement of the 
human rights crisis in Zimbabwe. This is despite the fact that, Southern Africa has a longer 
history of officially having the human rights norm adopted, compared to ASEAN member states. 
                                                          
6
 SADC comprises 15 countries; Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe (SADC, 2010). 
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The establishment of the African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights (ACHPR) in 1981 
proves this. This legal framework did not prevail and there has yet to be a successful outcome. 
At the international level, there were various efforts to pressurise the Mugabe regime, such as 
sanctions and exclusion from the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, these efforts were in vain, 
mainly due to the lack of collective action by neighbouring countries (Adelmann, 2004:250-251). 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that the responses of the two regional organisations 
differed considerably. Against this backdrop, the main focus in this study will be to examine why 
these two regional organisations responded differently to the human rights crises in their 
respective regions. 
1-2. Research Problem 
When it comes to the deterioration of the human rights situation in both regions, it is important to 
note that both regional organisations have stuck to the non-intervention norm since their 
establishment. For the ASEAN member states, states cannot legitimately intervene in issues that 
are of domestic concern to another state (Kraft, 2001:39). In the case of SADC, most member 
states gained independence relatively recently compared to other states in Africa and Asia. This 
became the grounds for their strong sense of non-intervention and led to their unwillingness to 
interfere in other members‘ domestic affairs. However, regarding the human rights violations 
which took place recently, the two regional organisations have responded differently; that is, 
ASEAN has changed its traditionally embedded norm. The question asked in this thesis is why 
the ASEAN states condemned human rights violations in Myanmar while the SADC states 
showed reluctance to take action regarding Zimbabwe. 
Both regional organisations, that is, ASEAN and SADC, have a long history in their respective 
regions. Regarding ASEAN, its initial goal was to establish a loose association stressing 
economic cooperation. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are 
founding members (Tarling, 1999:287). 
Before the formation of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed in 1961. 
Member states were Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. At that time, former President 
Sukarno of Indonesia strongly opposed the creation of ASA. This can be understood in a 
5 
 
historical context, especially when we consider his hostility towards Malaysia. Indonesia was 
confronted with the formation of Malaysia, and this was linked to the policy of ―Konfrontasi‖ 
from 1963 to 1966.  Sukarno, one of the advocates of the Non-Aligned Movement, considered 
that not only the formation of Malaysia but also ASA was backed by the British. Since one of the 
main catchphrases of ASA was ―economic development‖, he was worried that the ASA member 
states would heavily rely on the West in order to achieve their goal through the organisation. 
However, not only the fact that ASA failed to persuade Indonesia to join the organisation but 
also the territorial disputes between Malaysia and the Philippines caused problems. The creation 
of a new organisation which would encompass the whole of Southeast Asia was suggested. 
When Sukarno stepped down, this movement was accelerated (Narine, 2002:12). 
ASEAN was established in 1967; however, it was only in 1976 that the member states assembled 
in Bali for the first summit meeting. Narine (2002: 10) points out that ―no tradition of 
cooperation‖, and ―a history of dispute‖ resulted in tension in the region that adversely 
influenced the member states‘ relationships and cooperation. 
SADC was established in 1992 and its main goal was to promote economic integration, peace 
and security, and to alleviate poverty. SADC was originally established as the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. It was established in order to lessen 
economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. The transformation of the organisation into 
SADC took place in 1992. The regional power, South Africa, was included after 1992 (SADC, 
2010).  
The main reasons for replacing SADCC with SADC were firstly, that there was consensus 
regarding the marginalisation of the region; secondly, there were political and socio-economic 
problems transcending each member state‘s national borders, which served to highlight the need 
for cooperation. Finally, with the end of the Cold War and especially apartheid, ideological 
tension was reduced. Here it should be noted that strong ties involving resistance to apartheid 
were formed between member states even before the formation of SADC (Nathan, 2006:607-
608).  
The ASEAN and SADC communities have much in common. Firstly, ―human rights‖ is a new 
concept in both regional organisations. In the course of regional integration in both regions, 
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economic development was cited as a top priority. There was less interest in the social aspects, 
more specifically in human rights. In the case of ASEAN, the concepts of human rights, 
environment and democracy have only received recognition recently. Before 2007 when ASEAN 
adopted the new Charter, the words human rights did not even appear in the constitution (Aviel, 
2000:18). Also regarding SADC, most of the member states adopted policies to enhance global 
economic competitiveness, as they were less committed to making changes in socio-political 
realms such as the area of human rights (Adolfo, 2009). 
As seen, neither region has a long history of respect and protection for human rights norms, at 
least not as the concept is understood in the West (Christie and Roy, 2001:4). Some governments 
in Southeast Asia have stressed that human rights must be considered in the context of national 
and regional particularities and various historical cultural and religious backgrounds. Former 
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, of Malaysia said that what are claimed to be universal 
values are in fact of ―Western Origin‖. Many Southeast Asian leaders argue that human rights 
are based on Western liberal democratic values and that they are contrary to the indigenous 
values of Asia that emphasise ―community‖ (Kraft, 2001:34). In 1993, former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Hassan Wirajuda, stated that Asian countries could not accept the 
individual approach to human rights which is emphasised in the West and they could not 
disregard the interests of society and nations (Apodaca, 2002:885). Especially Malaysia and 
Singapore regarded human rights as a ―manoeuvre‖ by the West to achieve political and 
economic ends. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, Kishore Mabhubani, 
commented that ―all human rights covenants were created when the West was in power‖ (Asia 
Society, 2010:29).
7
 With regard to the case of Myanmar, Myanmar‘s arrest and detainment of 
Aung San Suu Kyi is a prominent example that challenges Western values of democracy and 
human rights.
8
 In this regard, Aung San Suu Kyi states that these arguments based on cultural 
                                                          
7
 The concept of ―Asian Values‖ was introduced by the Asian Intergovernmental Meeting in Bangkok in 1993. The 
major argument is that individual autonomy which Western thought emphasises does not reflect Asian values. In 
Asia, the interpretation of human rights has been controversial. Especially Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore and 
Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia argue that human rights should be interpreted by taking each country‘s national 
and regional conditions and values into consideration. However, these arguments have also been criticised. It has 
been said that these political leaders justified their authoritarian regimes, giving priority to their ―development 
agenda‖ and resisting the wave of democratisation (Donnelly, 1999).  
8
 To some extent, Aung San Suu Kyi has much in common with Morgan Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe. Both have fought 
against repressive regimes, leading the opposition parties, and at certain times these opposition parties were strong 
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relativism are attempts to ―block the aspiration of people for democratic institutions and human 
rights‖ (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1995:11).9  
As already mentioned, it can be seen that Africa has a longer history of respect for human rights 
norms than the ASEAN member states. The adoption of the ACHPR in 1981 can be cited as 
proof. However, the fact is that only in 1999, when Eritrea ratified the Charter, did it finally 
attain the full ratification of all member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
10
 
This shows that it took a long time for the concept of human rights to become widely recognised, 
and unfortunately the practice of human rights is still not deeply embedded in this region. A lack 
of knowledge and information is still a barrier preventing African people from claiming and 
exercising their human rights (Horn, 2009:59). According to Ruppel (2009:292), there are many 
human rights-related provisions within SADC. However, when it comes to their implementation 
it appears that they are merely a set of legally-binding platitudes. There exists another 
explanation why the actual practice of human rights does not enjoy priority. It seems that African 
countries have been likely to adopt human rights law because they viewed the concept of human 
rights and others such as good governance and democracy as preconditions for the receipt of aid. 
Although most countries on the African continent adopted some core aspects of democracy such 
as the multi-party system, they did not later show full commitment after receiving the aid (Banda, 
2006:21). 
Bearing in mind that both regional organisations have stuck to the non-intervention norm since 
their establishment, the focus in this thesis will be on the regional organisations‘ socialisation. 
Socialisation can be defined as the process during which states internalise norms originating 
elsewhere in the international system (Alderson, 2001:417). In the process of socialisation, 
regional organisations ―universalise‖ new human rights norms; in other words, they entice states 
that violate human rights, the so-called target states, to conform to the new norm. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enough to threaten the regimes, but could not succeed to bring about the change. Aung San Suu Kyi was under 
house arrest for more or less 14 years, and Morgan Tsvangirai, was arrested and detained several times. Both leaders 
were strongly supported by Western countries and gained the sympathy of neighbouring states as well. At the 
moment, Myanmar is planning an election in November in 2010 and Zimbabwe is planning one in 2011. It will be 
interesting to see the results of these two elections, the roles of the two political symbols and what the future holds 
for these two countries. 
9
 Her relationship with regional governments in Southeast Asia has been strained by her critical comments on the 
ASEAN‘s policy towards the regime in Myanmar (McCarthy, 2004).  
10
 The Africa Union (AU) was later formed as a successor to the OAU in 2002.   
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socialisation process will be examined by analysing the cases of ASEAN/Myanmar and 
SADC/Zimbabwe. 
1-3. Literature Review 
In this section, the focus will be on the theoretical contribution of existing literature. First of all, 
the focus will be on existing research on ASEAN/Myanmar and SADC/Zimbabwe. The 
theoretical framework will also be reviewed. 
1-3-1. ASEAN and Myanmar 
 
First of all, there are many studies that deal with the origins and the evolution of the ASEAN. In 
most studies, the main focus is on the security, political and economic aspects of the 
organisation. Here, Narine‘s work should be noted. Narine (2002) provides detailed descriptions 
of all aspects of ASEAN. However, Narine favours the rationalist, or even the realist view. He 
does not describe how the human rights norm has evolved through interaction between member 
states.  
Zaw (2001) provides profound information about Myanmar and its relations with ASEAN. Zaw 
deals with the relationship focusing on the various interests of member states and asserts that 
ASEAN has a moral obligation to assist Myanmar by pointing out that the human rights situation 
in Myanmar has deteriorated since the regime attained membership of the ASEAN. This will be 
discussed in detail in Section 3-3-2. 
It is only recently that the concept of human rights in this region has enjoyed attention. For 
example, Apodaca (2002) discusses economic factors such as trade and the impact of foreign 
investment on the human rights standard in this region. Especially after the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997, many Asian countries had to adopt transparency and the concept of good governance. 
Apodaca argues that later this tendency accelerated and this has contributed to the improvement 
of general human rights conditions in Southeast Asia. 
In the same context, Acharya (2004) places importance on the fact that the states in Southeast 
Asia have become democratised one by one and argues that this has resulted in challenges to the 
existing ―elite-centred‖ political tradition. Acharya feels the growth of civil society has led to 
9 
 
more openness in ASEAN. Acharya expects that this has helped ASEAN member states to 
abandon the strong non-intervention norm. Acharya points out that ―flexible engagement‖ 
allowed member states to comment openly on other states‘ internal matters and this has become 
one of the most significant challenges to ASEAN‘s non-intervention tradition.  
Many scholars feel that ASEAN will achieve a certain level of regional consciousness and give 
priority to collective interests over the national interests of member states. Morada (2008) agrees. 
He argues that when it comes to human rights, several member states are still reluctant to commit 
themselves. Nevertheless, he forecasts acceptance of the new norm as inevitable in the near 
future. Nowadays, he asserts that ASEAN can move on to become a ―people-centred‖ regional 
organisation by including non-state actors. 
McCarthy (2009) notes the establishment of the new charter of ASEAN. He argues that ASEAN 
yielded to internal and external pressure such as regional democratisation. Many member states 
experienced the growth of civil society. All these pressures forced ASEAN into the new 
direction; that is, becoming a human-centric regional organisation which focuses more on 
improving ordinary citizens‘ well being in the region, for example, advancing food security, and 
guaranteeing health security and environmental security. This argument can be understood in the 
same context as Morada‘s. 
Katsumata (2004) shows how norms such as human rights and democracy can be adopted despite 
traditions of non-intervention in Southeast Asia by showing that the environmental problems in 
Indonesia such the forest fires in 1997 and 1998 had significant social and environmental 
impacts on neighbouring states. In order to resolve this transnational environmental problem, the 
collective efforts of all the states were required. This helped the ASEAN member states to begin 
talking about each other‘s domestic issues.  
Katanyuu (2006) takes a similar stance to Katsumata‘s, showing how a problem of a certain state 
affects its neighbouring states and how this eventually helps states share a common identity. 
According to Katanyuu, Thailand‘s recent security and social problems are mainly derived from 
Myanmar. Katanyuu argues that the Thai government‘s efforts to resolve these problems became 
the starting point of the ASEAN member states‘ communicating better with each other. In this 
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process, member states had to become more transparent regarding domestic affairs. He feels that 
this will eventually bring about cooperation. 
1-3-2. SADC and Zimbabwe 
Most literature about Zimbabwe deals with South Africa‘s role in the human rights crisis in 
Zimbabwe. There are many reviews of South Africa‘s so-called ―quiet diplomacy‖ and studies of 
South Africa‘s foreign policy regarding the human rights issue of Zimbabwe (Alden, 2003; Obe, 
2006; Hamill and Hoffman, 2009). Policy reports of the Human Sciences Research Council 
(2008) express the criticism that both SADC and the AU refrained from condemning the 
Zimbabwean government and calling for mediation by the continental and regional 
organisations.   
Scholars such as Lipton (2009) argue that there was a lack of cooperative action among 
neighbouring states and Western actors. She points out that one reason for this is that South 
Africa and other countries of the South feel that the West uses the goals of good governance and 
respect for human rights as a neo-colonial device to advance their own interests and retain global 
dominance.  
Regarding SADC‘s stance, Nathan (2006) focuses on the ―absence of common values‖ among 
member states. This is a fundamental barrier to ―trust‖, ―common policy‖ and ―institutional 
cohesion‖ among member states. In other words, the SADC member states still stick to their 
national interest. Nathan emphasises the role of South Africa as regional key state regarding the 
improvement of the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe. 
Peter-Berries (2002) examines the impact of the Zimbabwean human rights crisis on political, 
economic and social aspects. For example, Peter-Berries points out that the Zimbabwean 
situation adversely influenced the reputation of SADC, and the economic development at a 
regional level. Also, this negatively influenced neighbouring countries‘ political stability. Peter-
Berries‘ perspective of the impact is based on the rationalist approach. When it comes to the 
resolution of the issue of Zimbabwe, Peter-Berries emphasises shaming, sanctions and 
suspension from the international organisation, which is similar to elements of strategic 
calculation, which will be discussed in Section 2-4-1 and Section 4-3-2.  
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Recently, Alden (2010) carried out a comparative study of the responses of ASEAN (Myanmar) 
and the SADC (Zimbabwe) to human rights crises. Alden focuses on how these regional 
organisations dealt with these two countries, the so called ―pariah‖ states. He points out that 
regional organisations are generally expected to work as mediators and accept, interpret and 
implement external norms. Regarding this, Alden argues that regional organisations in Asia and 
Africa served as ―bulwarks‖, that is a kind of defensive system against external forces. This view 
is important because it supports the opinion that existing views of regional organisation are based 
on the experience of the European Union (EU) and that many scholars apply this without any 
consideration of the region‘s particular historical, political or social context.  
This existing literature provides basic information applicable to this thesis. It is also possible to 
examine what has been done and what needs to be done. Through this process, a new perspective 
can be synthesised. It is possible to observe that many scholars discuss the Myanmar/ASEAN 
and Zimbabwe/SADC issues from the realist viewpoint. Nowadays, because the human rights 
issues in these two states have been drawing much attention, there have been several attempts to 
approach the issue from the constructivist viewpoint. However, only Alden tries to compare 
these two states and regional organisations‘ responses to human rights. Even though this research 
provides important insights, he does not describe the process in detail. In order to develop this 
perspective, it should be approached by applying concepts from constructivism such as norms 
and socialisation. 
Rationalists may argue that states only accept a new norm as a result of a rational cost-benefit 
analysis and to further their self-interest. For example, regarding the establishment of the AHRB, 
it is also said that ASEAN member states linked economic gains to creating the human rights 
mechanism. It should be noted that former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, 
admitted in 2006 that, ―there is a real and heavy economic cost to impunity in addressing the 
issue of human rights as an individual state‖ (Munro, 2009:24). In the case of SADC, it is 
noteworthy that the protection and promotion of human rights norms will be important in 
economic development because this can influence the creation of a favourable ―investment 
climate‖ for foreign investors, something that the region urgently needs (Ruppel, 2009:300).  
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However, considering that ASEAN‘s collective action regarding human rights has changed over 
time, from indifference to active intervention, rationalist approaches that assume ―fixed 
interests‖ as a given, prevent the meaningful study of the change derived from the socialisation 
process. Given that ASEAN and its member states now embrace the new norm and discard the 
existing non-intervention norm, it seems that constructivism can open the way for exploring this 
change.  
According to Onuf (1998:59-66), constructivism posits that people (agents) make society 
(structure), and society makes people, and this relationship is continuous and reciprocal. 
Between society and people, there exists another element that links the two, that is, ―social 
rules‖. These rules (norms) tell people what they should do; in other words, these rules provide 
standards people should follow. Checkel (2005:804) defines these norms as ―collective 
expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity‖.  
In the process of diffusion of norms, a regional organisation can play a vital role in ―inducing‖ 
member states to comply. The importance of norms lies in how they become a guide for the 
behaviour of actors. Norms are necessarily inter-subjectively determined, they are shaped mostly 
through the interaction of states in international relations (Kraft, 2001:38). Checkel (2005:804) 
sees this process that entices actors into following the norms and rules of a given community as 
―socialisation‖. Checkel (2005:804) also delineates mechanisms which can make socialisation 
possible, such as strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion. These three 
mechanisms can provide a useful framework for exploring the two regional organisations in 
terms of socialisation. They will be elaborated in more detail in the literature review section in 
chapter two. 
1-4. Research Methods 
This research entails a comparative analysis of Southeast Asia and Southern Africa in a 
qualitative manner. Comparative researchers examine patterns of similarities and differences 
across cases. While conducting comparative research, researchers can face several obstacles. A 
comparative analysis can be challenging in its demand to study a variety of contexts and cases. 
Sometimes it requires a field trip to a foreign country and the understanding of foreign 
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languages. Despite these disadvantages, a comparative analysis can indicate different patterns or 
similarities that may exist within a specific set of cases chosen by a researcher (Ragin, 1994). 
Also, it is said that a comparative analysis, at the national level, is beneficial to the formation of 
new policy (Lewis-Beck, Bryman and Liao, 2004:152). Since comparative insights can be gained 
through the process of comparing and contrasting the different cases, case study will be involved 
and implemented. In this thesis, the case studies will involve a detailed analysis of the three 
mechanisms, focusing on the process of socialisation. The differences and similarities which can 
be found in the process of socialisation will be examined. 
This study is also an explanatory study. This is defined as ―research with the primary aim of 
establishing causal relationships between variables‖ (Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee, 2006:182). 
Johnson and Joslyn (1986:17-18) discuss the fact that through explanatory study, a researcher 
can find a certain reason or explanation for a ―behaviour, attitude, or event‖ and this is the proper 
method to answer a ―why‖ question. Since in this thesis an answer is sought for the question why 
two regional organisations responded differently, this explanatory method is suitable. 
This research is based largely on secondary sources such as articles in journals and books about 
Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. Primary sources such as interviews and official records can 
provide a very close view of a particular event. Despite this benefit of using primary sources, the 
reason why this thesis relies on secondary sources is that, for example, Myanmar is an isolated 
and closed country. It would not be possible to access primary sources. In other words, even if it 
were possible to interview someone like a diplomat, it would have been difficult to hear his or 
her honest opinion about the human rights situation in Myanmar. Therefore, this thesis had to 
rely on secondary sources such as political commentary and academic journals. The time span of 
this case study is mainly from 1990 to the present and work published as recently as 2010 is 
used. However, a brief discussion of the historical aspect is necessary, especially as both regions‘ 
colonial experience cannot be detached from the current human rights violations. 
1-5. Limitations of the Study 
When it comes to human rights violations, the general lack of accurate information has been one 
of the limitations of the study. For example, in the cases of Myanmar and Zimbabwe, due to 
media censorship, it is difficult to examine the recent situations precisely. 
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When conducting a case study, it is sometimes difficult to find balanced resources. For example, 
relatively many studies have been conducted about the responses of ASEAN and its member 
states to Myanmar‘s human rights situation. However, there has not been much research into 
SADC and other member states except South Africa‘s role in resolving the human rights abuses 
in Zimbabwe.  
Also, there is little concrete data on the ASEAN and the SADC member states‘ public opinions. 
It is possible to find and analyse the high profile decision-makers‘ opinions by looking at their 
statements. However, if we wish to measure whether human rights norms are fully socialised or 
not, it is essential that we find some gauge of public opinion. For this reason, it is difficult to 
measure the level of socialisation. Also, both ASEAN and SADC have been criticised for their 
lack of transparency in terms of the decision-making process. Important decisions are likely to be 
discussed between top-officials behind the scenes. Therefore, it is difficult to figure out what 
precisely was discussed between them. 
The socialisation process is a ―large zone‖ to demarcate, in which sometimes two or more 
mechanisms exert influence at the same time. Also the process of socialisation is a long term 
process. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish a long term convergence of state interests from 
just the establishment of a new human rights body or from enactments. 
1-6. Outline of the Study 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the study. In the 
introduction, the background to the study and the research problem are provided; furthermore, 
there is a literature survey, methods and limitations are discussed and an outline of the study is 
presented. In the second chapter, a theoretical framework on socialisation and its three 
mechanisms will be presented. Chapter three will consist of a case study of ASEAN and 
Myanmar. The case study will be a detailed review of the process of socialisation in Southeast 
Asia. Chapter four will comprise a case study of SADC and Zimbabwe. As in chapter three, in 
chapter four a detailed analysis of the regional organisation‘s socialisation in Southern Africa 
will be done. Finally, chapter five is the conclusion of the study with some lessons learnt and 
recommendations for further research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2-1. Introduction 
Scholars who study the EU have recently put effort into elucidating the causal relationships of 
socialisation. They focus on individual agents to various sub-organisations of the EU. Hooghe 
(2005) focuses on the European Commission‘s role in socialising individual officials. Lewis 
(2005) studies the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). His assumption is that 
the COREPER itself uses a range of mechanisms of socialisation, strategic calculation, role-
playing and normative suasion. Schimmelfennig (2005) analyses the process through which 
Western international institutions influenced Central and Eastern European countries striving for 
membership. The fundamental assumption of these studies is that institutions, that is, regional 
organisations, ―trigger‖ socialisation (Zurn and Checkel, 2005, Hooghe, 2005, Lewis, 2005 and 
Schimmelfennig, 2005). This process of socialisation lies at the centre of constructivism, which 
is a theoretical approach that emphasises the diffusion of norms. Therefore, it will be helpful to 
review the existing literature on constructivism and the socialisation of norms and through an 
evaluation of the literature it will be possible to find ideas that are applicable to this research 
endeavour. 
2-2. The Main Assumptions of Constructivism and Their 
Application to Norms and Regional Organisations 
In this section, firstly, the basic assumption of constructivists will be studied and then the focus 
will shift to norms which are central to constructivism. Constructivists regard the world as 
―socially constructed‖ (Wendt, 1999:429). Here, ―socially‖ means that constructivists give 
weight to social or subjective forces, not just to objective or material forces as realists do. 
Constructivists also understand that material forces matter, but they believe that what matters 
most is ―subjective understanding of objective conditions‖ (Wendt, 1995:78). ―Constructed‖ 
means that constructivists understand the world as an interactive process between agents and the 
objective elements of ―physical reality‖. Constructivists believe that there is a process of mutual 
constitution between agents and objective forces; the result is the creation of ―socially 
constructed‖ reality (Flanik, 2009). This perspective contributes in many ways to how scholars 
regard international relations, global change and transformation (Barnett, 2008:171). Also, it is 
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important to analyse the various actors from the perspective of the constructivists, which has 
been overlooked by the state-centric approach of rationalists; namely, that the state is the 
unilateral actor in international relations. Consequently, constructivism helps us understand the 
dynamics of interaction between various actors and through this process it is possible to see how 
new ideas or discourses that shape actors‘ understanding have emerged and become diffused.  
For rationalists, accepting a new norm is related to a state‘s calculation of self-interest. 
Especially from the realist‘s point of view, the distribution of material power among states 
determines international policy. Therefore, the acceptance of human rights norms will only take 
place if promoted by a hegemon. Liberalists feel that norms and institutions are a distinctive 
feature of democracies and they can help to constrain any kinds of conflicts between states. The 
human rights norm is accepted by establishing human rights instruments, because these 
instruments can be used by states to protect unstable democratic regimes against non-democratic 
states (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2002:521-522).  
The views of constructivists regarding how states define their interests differ from those of 
rationalists. Constructivists regard states as ―social agents‖ whose interests and identities are 
formed, developed and changed in their own environments (Burchill, 2005:198). Furthermore, 
Finnemore (1996:2-3) claims that the environments in which states are embedded are comprised 
of a network of various social relations. The actors in this network shape normative concepts 
about what is good and bad, which in turn influences states‘ behaviour. Finnemore (Burchill, 
2005:201) stresses the importance of this ―normative socialisation‖. International institutions 
play an important role in spreading this normative socialisation. In order to meet the standards of 
this normative concept, states that would like to join the institution ultimately participate in 
regional cooperation. Through this process, a norm can be diffused, which in turn can also 
consolidate cooperation. 
Norms are defined as ―inter-subjective‖ beliefs about the social and natural world that define 
actors, their situations and the possibilities of action (Wendt, 1995:73-74). Norms channel and 
regularise behaviour and limit the range of choice (Katzenstein, 1996:5). This guidance is 
accepted as proper or appropriate and it is based on inter-subjective ideas (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998:890-894).  
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These ―inter-subjective‖ beliefs are important to the nature of regional organisation because 
regional organisation can be where regional identity and a shared sense of belonging is 
developed. Identity and interests are formed through interactions among actors who are affected 
by the ideas of others in the regional organisation (Acharya, 2001:22-24).  
Rationalists feel that institutions exist because they increase the welfare of a country and can be 
instrumental in reducing transaction costs. Therefore it is possible to limit sovereignty via 
coercive mechanisms. However, constructivists focus on inter-subjective beliefs of the group. 
Members can develop a regional identity and shared interests through interaction; this does not 
mean reduced sovereignty (Adler, 1997). 
2-3. Socialisation 
Socialisation is defined as ―the process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, 
attitudes and behaviour accepted and practiced by the ongoing system‖ (Freedman and 
Freedman, 1981:258). According to Barnes, Carter and Skidmore (1980:35), socialisation is 
defined as the ―induction of new members into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a 
society‖. Checkel (2005) also stresses that socialisation means ―the process of inducting 
individuals into the norms and rules of a given community‖. Johnston (2008:20) defines 
socialisation as ―a process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of 
thinking, feeling, and acting.‖ From these definitions, it is possible to see that socialisation 
emphasises institutions‘ inducting role. Capie also (2007) points out that literature on 
socialisation emphasises institutions‘ inducting role by regarding regional organisations as ―norm 
teachers‖. However, Capie argues that institutions should be seen as recipients as well, and 
furthermore emphasises the roles of institutions as actors that receive, reject and even reframe 
norms. Capie‘s critique is important; it implies that ASEAN and SADC are actors that receive 
new norms from international society. 
The ultimate goal of socialisation is that the norm should have a deep and long-term impact on 
the identity of the ―socialisee‖ states (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2002:523). Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998: 894-905) delineate the process of socialisation by focusing on the diffusion of norms and 
on introducing the ―norm cycle‖ which shows how norm socialisation develops, how social 
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interaction takes place regarding norm diffusion, and mainly focus on how in the end 
international norms affect domestic structural change.  
2-4. Mechanisms of Socialisation  
In this section the three mechanisms that can result in socialisation and which are discussed 
above, will be examined in detail. These factors can help us to understand how actors accept new 
norms, change their behaviour and shape policies that comply with the new norms. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:906), there are certain conditions that trigger 
socialisation. First of all, they emphasise the importance of legitimation. In order to enhance its 
reputation in international society, a state is likely to adopt new international norms. These 
authors also view prominence as essential. They argue that ―some domestic norms appear more 
likely candidates for internationalisation than others.‖ As one of the reasons for this, they suggest 
the ―quality‖ of norm—in other words, the ―goodness‖ or ―oughtness‖ of the norm. Also, 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:906) discuss ―hegemonic socialisation‖, they say that if norms are 
accepted by the hegemon, they are likely to gain more influence. Thirdly, they discuss the 
characteristics of norms, namely the ―intrinsic characteristics of the norm‖. Norms should be 
―clear and specific‖ and ―universalism, individualism, voluntaristic authority, rational progress, 
and world citizenship‖ all play a role. They suggest that norms underpinned by these principles 
will be more successful internationally (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:907). Also, adjacency is 
suggested as one of factors. In other words, when the norms fit into existing normative 
frameworks, they are likely to be more influential. World time context is another important 
factor. World historical events such as wars or major disasters are likely to trigger the search for 
new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:909). These factors are important when trying to 
understand how norms can be triggered and diffused. However, they do not fully explain the 
process of attaining the phase of socialisation. This section will focus on the whole process of 
socialisation. It must be noted that in order to attain socialisation – that is, a specific outcome 
from initial conditions – mechanisms which link these causes and effects are needed (Hooghe, 
2005). 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:901) discuss the components of mechanisms as ―a combination of 
material sanctions and symbolic peer pressure among states‖. Finnemore and Sikkink also state 
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that mechanisms can be tangible and intangible, and they can often be a combination of both. In 
the same context, Checkel (2005) suggests normative suasion, role playing and strategic 
calculation as mechanisms, and these provide a useful framework for this research.  
Ultimately, these mechanisms play important roles to bring about a specific outcome; that is, 
sustained compliance based on the internalisation of new norms. In other words, the ultimate 
goal of socialisation is to change actors‘ behaviour. Socialisation implies that an actor switches 
from ―a logic of consequences‖ to ―a logic of appropriateness‖ (Checkel, 2005:804). The logic of 
consequences attributes action to the anticipated costs and benefits. The logic of appropriateness 
means actors are worried about whether their actions are legitimate or not (Barnett, 2008:163). 
Simply speaking, when an actor reaches the logic of appropriateness stage, it will be possible to 
say that the actor is socialised. In this research, socialisation and its mechanisms will be 
discussed in the sense of an actor‘s change from ―a logic of consequence‖ to ―a logic of 
appropriateness‖. In the process, what should be noted is that Checkel‘s three mechanisms do not 
need to be ordinal; these three mechanisms can take effect at the same time. 
2-4-1. Strategic Calculation 
Human rights norms are likely to be regarded as having low priority by governments or elites 
who are involved in decision-making processes. Falk (1999:17) states that strategic interests are 
dominant, and that this rationalist mindset limits adoption of human rights norms. However, this 
calculation can be a starting point. According to Schimmelfennig‘s (2005) empirical study, 
Central and Eastern Europe violated liberal norms initially, but they were enticed by the EU‘s 
providing conditional membership as a form of material reward, and this resulted in socialisation 
inside former communist countries. 
According to Checkel (2005:804), strategic calculation involves material and social rewards (or 
punishment). Actually, strategic calculation has its origins in rational theory. This rationalist 
approach is also emphasised in Keck and Sikkink‘s research. Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest 
―transnational advocacy networks‖, a combination of local NGOs, international NGOs and 
Western states to sort out the problems in errant states. This model explains that when a local 
NGO experiences oppression from a regime, it is likely to seek outside help by linking with other 
states – mainly Western states. Transnational advocacy networks often use sanctions as tools 
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(Okafor, 2004:419). As this approach is based on rationalist ideas, it focuses on the coercion 
mechanism (Johnston, 2001:487). Nevertheless, Checkel and Schimmelfennig (2005) emphasise 
that normative suasion cannot bring about socialisation on its own. Koh (2005:975) points out 
that a holistic approach is needed, that means ―a combination of norm acceptance, conformity, 
and self-interest‖.  
Johnston (2001:487) says that international institutions can direct a state‘s behaviour in a more 
cooperative direction through material rewards or punishments. Here, ―membership 
conditionality‖ by institutions can trigger socialisation in more effective ways on condition that 
the errant state adopts and complies with the regional organisation‘s new norm (Checkel, 
2005:809). Regarding this membership acceptance, Goodman and Jinks (2004:29) argue that one 
of its advantages is to expose human rights violation of states to the ―regularised 
communicative‖ environment by granting membership. This is especially important in the case 
of Myanmar, which does not have much connection with other international organisations. 
Opening this country to the communicative environment is crucial. There are other factors as 
well. Regional organisations can use tactics to limit the participation of states guilty of human 
rights violations by denying them access to regional and preparatory meetings, rejecting 
credentials required for participation, limiting voting or speaking rights and adopting 
extraordinary resolutions such as exclusion from regional organisations, which are related to 
processes of shaming (Goodman and Jinks, 2004:25).  
Even though strategic calculation is related to material coercion, it is possible to see it as social 
and symbolic. Johnston (2001:499-500) discusses rewards and punishments as components of 
strategic calculation. These two factors can be symbolic, that is, more social than material; for 
example, ―rewards include international recognition, public praise, and invitations to 
intergovernmental meetings, and punishments include shaming, and shunning‖.  
Alone, this mechanism of strategic calculation does not constitute socialisation or internalisation, 
as there is no switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; in other words, 
the state still behaves according to its self-interest, calculating cost and benefit. However, 
strategic calculation can be important as a starting point that brings about socialisation. Because 
the states still behave according to their self-interests (Checkel, 2005:809).  
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2-4-2. Role Playing 
According to Warkotsch (2004:241), the literature on international socialisation usually 
distinguishes between two mechanisms namely, strategic calculation and normative suasion. 
Warkotsch argues that the socialisation process needs to use a more step-by-step or gradual 
approach since there is a wide gap between strategic calculation and normative suasion. Here, 
role-playing is useful.  
Checkel (2005:810) explains role-playing as ―organisational or group environments providing 
shortcuts, cues, and buffers that can lead to the enactment of particular role conceptions, that is 
role-playing, among individuals‖. He explains that actors adopt certain roles because they are 
appropriate in that particular setting. It seems actors now think harder about what is ―good‖ or 
―bad‖.  
When it comes to this setting, there are two conditions for the actor to adopt certain roles in a 
particular environment. One is ―contact‖ – and this interaction should be long and sustained. 
Duration of interaction among actors is significant. Another condition is that contact should be 
intense. The increased level of interaction between states can increase the possibility of states 
taking on new norms, leading to an increased probability of interest convergence. In this process 
―actors can learn other‘s expectations through socialisation. Here others can provide symbolic 
cues to elicit the appropriate behaviour or anticipatory socialisation in which an actor is given an 
opportunity to try out a role through role-playing‖ (Thies, 2009:13). Interaction in regional 
organisations could reduce ―uncertainty about the credibility of others‘ commitment and thus 
help actors‘ expectations converge around some cooperation outcome‖ (Martin, 1997). 
Checkel (2005:811) also discusses that those who have ―extensive previous professional 
experiences‖ in regional organisations are more likely to internalise role conceptions to their 
targets. For example, if there is any experience working multilaterally at the regional level such 
as policy-making settings, this can lead to more opportunities to socialise. Here, foreign policy-
makers such as ministers or diplomats play important roles. For example, if diplomats from 
Myanmar or Zimbabwe have more opportunities to interact with other states, it is more likely 
that new norms well be accepted. However, in the cases of these two countries, they have 
generally denied allegations of human rights abuses and dismissed international pressure. Also, it 
22 
 
is said that their main obligation is to monitor the activities of exiles. Therefore, in this thesis, the 
focus will be on continual interaction among the members of regional organisations. Their 
interaction can transmit the new norm at the state level and they are influential in applying new 
norms to the redefined states‘ interests within the structure of regional organisations. However, 
as NGOs have begun to exert more influence in the international realm, their role in creating a 
new environment cannot be overlooked. Various enactments of laws at the regional level show 
that most states are now aware of human rights norms. As a result, a highly institutionalised 
social environment where new information is linked to shared identity provides a proper 
environment for states to play a role and a cue to re-examine current practices and positions 
(Goodman and Jinks, 2004: 12). Through this process, role-playing can provide a more 
communicative environment.  
Checkel (2005:812) argues that when role playing occurs, the shift from a logic of consequences 
toward a logic of appropriateness begins. According to Checkel (2005:812), ―while the adoption 
of a new role may be chosen on the basis of cost and benefit calculations, it may later become an 
unconscious habit, and compliance with rules and norms may occur in a non-reflective manner‖. 
From the perspective of targets, states follow international rules not just because of calculation of 
how the outcome will affect their interest, but because a repeated habit of obedience within a 
societal setting socialises them and remakes their interests so that they come to value rule 
compliance (Kho, 2005:975). Individuals and states take on roles because it is easier to socialise 
than always to act strategically. This implies that actors are still passive when playing new roles, 
not spontaneously accepting of them. However, this role-playing may later become perceived as 
―taken-for-granted‖. 
2-4-3. Normative Suasion 
While rationalists focus on the material aspects of socialisation mechanisms, constructivists 
regard persuasion as the central part of socialisation. Normative suasion means that ―rational‖ 
(strategic calculation) and ―communicative‖ (role playing) actors redefine their interests through 
persuasion by other actors and conform to the new norm. Goodman and Jinks (2004:11) argue 
that suasion is not simply a process of manipulating exogenous incentives to elicit behaviour 
from the other side. Rather, it requires deliberation in an effort to change the minds of others and 
to persuade actors to internalise new norms of appropriateness. 
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Warkotsch (2008:241) argues that normative suasion is engagement between ―socialisers‖ and 
―socialisees‖, a process of trying to persuade and convince the socialisees through argument that 
their (the socialisers‘) interests and preferences are the ―correct‖ ones. Warkotsch says that 
through this process, the socialisees are persuaded by the legitimacy or the validity of the 
socialisers‘ claims and change their identities and interests accordingly. 
Lewis (2005:939) argues that unlike the other two mechanisms, normative suasion brings about 
change of interests. Lewis argues that as an outcome of normative suasion, not only the actors‘ 
behavioural adaption including altered strategies takes place, but the actor also expands its 
conception of itself. In the end, the whole group starts redefining a national position or reshaping 
domestic constraints (Lewis, 2005:951). There are many ways to reach a logic of 
appropriateness. However, following a logic of appropriateness may go beyond strategic 
calculation and role playing and imply that actors accept organisational norms as ―the right thing 
to do‖.  
According to Checkel (2005:812), when normative suasion takes place, member states become 
proactive and adjust themselves in order to internalise new norms and at this stage the switch 
from a logic of consequences to one of appropriateness is complete. In other words, as an 
outcome of socialisation, states internalise the standards of groups or communities. 
The three mechanisms mentioned above can provide a useful framework for examining the two 
cases in this study. However, the literature discussed here deals mainly with the EU. Considering 
the EU‘s degree of integration, its characteristics as an institution that leads to socialisation will 
differ from those of Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. This difference will be highlighted in 
the case studies.  
2-5. Conclusion 
In this chapter a review of the main assumption of constructivism, its relation to regional 
organisations, socialisation and the three main mechanisms as posited by Checkel, is given. What 
is essential for this thesis regarding constructivism is that constructivists see that norms can 
influence states‘ behaviour through their impact on the states‘ interests, and furthermore states‘ 
identity. Also, it is noticeable that when norms spread, a regional organisation can play an 
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important role by providing new guidelines or a new environment for states. This can eventually 
lead to socialisation.  
Mainly based on the experience of the EU, scholars have figured out the mechanisms which can 
result in socialisation. They are strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion. 
Considering that the level of regional integration in both Southeast Asia and Southern Africa is 
far behind that of the EU, the elements such as strategic calculation which can make initial 
cooperation possible, are significant. Here, what should be noted is that constructivists accept the 
role of material factors such as rewards and punishment, the components of strategic calculation. 
Constructivists consider that these can trigger socialisation. The framework – which consists of 
these three mechanisms, strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion - will be 
further elaborated upon during the discussion of ASEAN/Myanmar and SADC/Zimbabwe. 
Moreover, it is also noticeable that a diverse range of actors including state actors and non-state 
actors are involved in the process of socialisation. Therefore, in the next chapters there will be a 
discussion of how these actors share common values and resources and exchange information in 
order to resolve the dire human rights situation in Myanmar and Zimbabwe. In the course of 
analysis, it will be possible to figure out how the regional organisations in both regions help 
various actors shape new ideas, that is new human rights norms, which did not exist in these 
regions in the past. 
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3. Myanmar and ASEAN 
3-1. Introduction 
Myanmar‘s repressive regime and its oppression of pro-democracy movements have aroused the 
concern of the international community. There have been continual sanctions and strong 
condemnation from mainly Western states and international human rights NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, with the purpose of improving the situation 
regarding human rights in Myanmar. Recently, these actors have begun to target not only 
Myanmar but also the regional organisation that Myanmar belongs to, namely ASEAN, urging it 
to take strong action. In response, ASEAN and its member states have shown different reactions 
over time, ranging from defensive reactions including self-justification, to adaptive responses 
like showing criticism of the regime in Myanmar, which represents a break with the traditional 
norm of non-intervention in this region. 
ASEAN has upheld the norm of non-intervention since its establishment. However, recently, in 
response to the human rights abuses in Myanmar, it seems that ASEAN has accepted 
humanitarian intervention as a new norm in Southeast Asia, which has led ASEAN states to 
change their approach officially calling for the regime in Myanmar to solve the human rights 
situation peacefully (Charney, 2009:185). This collective action taken by ASEAN member states 
implies that the existing non-intervention norm which was deeply embedded in this region, has 
changed. Moreover, this new attitude led to the establishment of the AHRB in 2009 (McCarthy, 
2009:158). 
In this section, the focus will be firstly on Myanmar‘s human rights violations since its 
independence to the present. Secondly, ASEAN and its member states‘ responses will be 
analysed using the theoretical framework discussed in the previous section; that is, strategic 
calculation, role-playing and normative suasion.  
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3-2. Background to the Issue of Myanmar 
3-2-1. British Colonialism and Ethnic Factions 
In this section, the background to the the human rights violations in Myanmar will be discussed. 
Human rights violations after independence in 1948 will be discussed from political and 
economic perspectives. It will, however, be necessary to look first at the influence of British rule 
on Myanmar. Myanmar‘s volatile socio-political situation is, to some extent, the result of ethnic 
conflicts that have their roots in the independence period, and it is often said that British rule 
adversely affected ethnic factions in Myanmar. The divide-and-rule policy of British colonialism 
was intended to create or encourage divisions among the ethnic groups in order to prevent them 
from forming alliances. It is said that this policy became an impediment to creating a unified 
sense of ―nationhood‖ after independence (Shah, 2001).11 
There is another historical legacy of British colonialism. In the course of nation-building, several 
ethnic groups became marginalised by the new constitution and expressed their discontent 
through rebellions against the government. The prominent example is the Karen. Here, the 
problem is that the British used the Karen in their campaign against Japan during the Second 
World War. To do so, the British provided the Karen with military training and arms. After 
independence, they were not completely disarmed. This combined with the fragmented tendency 
towards nation-building discussed above, encouraged them to seek autonomy and they chose to 
use violence to gain independence. The Karen National Union (KNU) is the largest insurgent 
group and continues to fight against the regime. By the end of 2003, the KNU and the 
government agreed on a verbal ceasefire, and formal ceasefire discussions commenced early in 
2004. Nevertheless, in 2005, the government launched its largest military campaign in Karen 
State. During the attacks, Karen villages and their inhabitants were seriously damaged, and 
operations resulted in large scale of human rights abuses and it is reported that the attacks have  
                                                          
11
 Ethnic minorities make up about a third of Myanmar's population. Myanmar‘s population is now estimated at over 
48 million, thus, more or less 16 million of the population belong to ethnic minorities, more specifically, Burman 
68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, other 5%. These ethnic minorities live 
throughout Myanmar, however, they are concentrated mainly in the seven divisions named after the ethnic groups 
(CIA World Factbook, 2010). 
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continued. In these circumstances minority communities were forced to move.
12
 Unlawful 
killings, torture, disappearances, and the destruction or confiscation of crops and food-stocks 
were continually carried out. This repression was committed in order to block the insurgence 
from spreading from Karen to other ethnic groups (HRDU, 2009: 21).
13
 
Facing resistance from ethnic minorities, the successive governments in Myanmar used various 
methods, not only repression but also economic deprivation and cultural assimilation. Especially 
cultural assimilation was used to integrate ethnic minority groups into the Buddhist Burman 
majority. This is referred to as ―Burmanisation‖. During the process of Burmanisation, Christian 
Chins and Muslim Rohingya had extreme difficulty in practising their religions.
14
 Governments 
also prohibited the wearing of traditional costume, the performance of traditional ceremonies, 
and the learning of ethnic languages. In this repressive environment, many ethnic groups 
followed the example of the people of Karen and chose rebellious ways to oppose the central 
Burman-dominated government. This was regarded as a serious threat to the state‘s security, and 
successive governments have justified their suppression as necessary to maintain social order and 
national unity (Cheeppensook, 2007:6).  
3-2-2. Political Repression under Military Regimes  
Immediately after independence, during the constitutional period Myanmar was ruled by a 
democratic, parliamentary government. However, in 1962, when Ne Win came to power by 
coup, he built up the army to maintain his rule. Ne Win maintained his power by establishing a 
Revolutionary Council (RC), this RC established the Burmese Socialist People‘s Party (BSPP) 
and it became the only legitimate political party in the country. In 1971, the BSPP made a 
gesture to transform itself into a civilian government, however, it still retained the same military 
                                                          
12
 In the aftermath of attacks, a massive exodus of refugees took place. The 2009 World Refugee Survey shows that 
there were 750,000 refugees from Myanmar. More than a half headed for Thailand. Also a lot of refugees fled into 
Bangladesh and India across shared borders (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009). 
13
 The Human Rights Documentation Unit (HRDU) is one of the divisions of the NCGUB. This exile government, 
the NCGUB, headquartered in the US, publishes a report titled the Burma Human Rights Yearbook since 1994, 
reporting the situation in Myanmar (NCGUB, 2010). 
14
 It is alleged that in the process of Burmanisation, the Muslim community has suffered the most serious 
persecution. In 1978 the people of Arakan took part in one of the greatest refugee exoduses, over 200,000 Arakanese 
Muslims fled into Bangladesh (Berlie, 2008:47). 
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rulers. A new constitution in 1974 further strengthened BSPP's position as the only legal political 
party in the country (HRDU, 2009:8).  
In these circumstances, the government faced protests by workers and students calling for 
political rights. In response, Ne Win repressed these political movements, and increased its 
methods of political and social control. As a form of political oppression, the media was 
censored. The regime did not want the press to play a political role and criticise the regime 
(Charney, 2009:111). At that time, the government also closed the universities because it 
believed that foreign ideologies, such as democracy, were interfering with its domestic politics 
(Charney, 2009:115). By eliminating the freedom of the press and hampering the spread of 
democracy by education, the government tried to block the spread of discontent among the 
public. 
In July 1988, the BSPP appointed Sein Lwin as the new party head and later president. A month 
later, on the 8
th
 of August, students and activists organised a peaceful nationwide protest to 
demonstrate their opposition to continued military rule. This was later called the 8888 uprising, 
named after the year and date when it took place. The police and military responded to the 
protests with force, killing at least 20 people, mainly students, and arresting hundreds of others. 
Later, the movement became stronger. The demand for political change became unified and 
spread all over the country (HRDU, 2009:12). 
Shortly after the 8888 uprising, the BSPP was dissolved and its President, Sein Lwin, was 
replaced by a civilian lawyer named Maung Maung, one of Ne Win‘s allies. Even though there 
was now a civilian president, the new government was also criticised as the new president was 
also responsible for human rights abuses. In any case, this new government proved to be only a 
temporary government. The military regained power through a bloody coup. The revived 
military regime took control and established itself as the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) (Charney, 2009:150-160). 
In September 1988, the SLORC publicly declared that the series of military interventions was to 
restore law and order, improve the economic conditions of the people, and organise multiparty 
elections as soon as possible. However, the SLORC repressed the campaigns of its political 
opponents, particularly the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, 
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daughter of Myanmar‘s independence hero, General Aung San.15 In 1989, the SLORC placed 
Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest and disqualified her from participating in the elections 
(HRDU, 2009:12). This is one of the reasons why Myanmar was criticised by the international 
community which put importance on liberty and participation in political life, and also aimed to 
protect individuals from excesses by the state.  
In spite of all the interference, such as the suppression of the NLD‘s leaders and supporters, the 
NLD achieved a complete victory in the elections in 1990, winning 392 of the 485 seats. 
However, the SLORC refused to step down from power. The elections were nullified, all 
opposition parties were banned and their members were arrested (Amnesty International, 2009). 
As a result of this, numerous of those elected in the election in 1990 were exiled. Several exiled 
political groups settled abroad and actively take part in political activities, bringing the situation 
in Myanmar to the attention of the international community (HRDU, 2009:13). 
In November 1997, the SLORC was reorganised and renamed the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC). Although a few new members were nominated to serve in the government, the 
SPDC was intrinsically the same as the SLORC. In 2000, the SPDC initiated a major crackdown 
on NLD leaders and Aung San Suu Kyi was again placed under house arrest (HRDU, 2009:16). 
Later, as a result of international and regional pressure, there was a slight improvement in the 
human rights situation in Myanmar, with for example Aung San Suu Kyi being released (Zaw, 
2001:46). However, the regime repeatedly laid charges against Aung San Suu Kyi and the talks 
between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta, which were facilitated by the UN envoys, did not have 
a successful outcome (Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, 2003:457). The regime in Myanmar can be 
criticised in that it used Aung San Suu Kyi‘s repeated release and detainment in order to gain 
leverage for dealing with pressure from international and regional communities. After the 2000 
crackdown on the NLD, international pressure calling for the improvement of the country‘s 
human rights record increased. The EU had actually already adopted a related rule in the late 
1990s known as a Common Position on Burma. A ban on the sale or transfer of arms and 
weapons to the country, visa restrictions on members of the military regime and their families 
                                                          
15
 General Aung San is regarded as the one who brought about Myanmar's independence from British colonial rule. 
The military regimes tried to eradicate all traces of Aung San's legacy (Smith, 1991:198). In that sense, the 
repression of Aung San Suu Kyi can be understood as a continuation of the eradication of the legacy of General 
Aung San. 
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and allies, and a freeze on overseas assets were imposed. The EU also suspended all bilateral aid. 
The sanctions were extended after the regime violently suppressed anti-government protests in 
2007 to include a ban on the import of gems, timber and metals, major export products of 
Myanmar. The US imposed an arms embargo on Myanmar in 1993 and then widened its 
sanctions to include all new investment in Myanmar. In 2003, the Burma Freedom and 
Democracy Act banned imports from the country including major products, as the EU had done. 
The act also restricted financial transactions, froze the assets of the regime and extended visa 
restrictions on officials. Australia and New Zealand took similar actions, such as visa restrictions, 
in order to isolate the regime in Myanmar (―Overview of Burma Sanctions‖, 2009).16 These 
external pressures temporarily forced the SPDC to release political prisoners, and this was seen 
as a sign of change in the regime. However, the regime continued to monitor its political 
opponents and build up aggression towards other ethnic groups. The fundamental political 
situation remained the same. 
3-2-3. Economic Deterioration 
It is said that Myanmar has a rich endowment of agricultural, mining and forestry resources 
which can attract many foreign investors and this could be a driving force of economic 
development. However, the policy of nationalisation blocked the involvement of foreign 
businesses and this had a negative effect on the economy. Also, government spending priorities 
were skewed towards the military and basic services such as health and education were neglected. 
The budget for the Ministry of Health in the 2006-2007 accounted for only 0.8% of the total 
national budget and the budget for the Ministry of Education accounted for 1.9% (HRDU, 
                                                          
16
 Despite these economic sanctions, the cases of Myanmar and Zimbabwe show that so-called international pariah 
states can survive. Myanmar and Zimbabwe have both had sanctions imposed on them, but they have found 
alternative means of survival. For example, in the case of Myanmar, the regime has been involved in drug 
production and trafficking. Also, when sanctions were imposed, neighbouring states that were interested in 
Myanmar‘s natural resources, rendered help. Other Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea enjoyed 
trading with and investing in Myanmar (Robinson, 1996:90). It is said that the share of Asian trading partners in 
Myanmar‘s total trade rose from 67% in 2000 to 82% in 2005 (Alamgir, 2008:987). In the case of Zimbabwe, other 
neighbouring countries also suffered economic hardship and inter-SADC trade was small, therefore, it is difficult to 
figure out economically how neighbouring countries have helped. However, recently, Chinese support can be seen 
as the decisive factor that has made the Mugabe regime‘s survival possible. Based on these cases, it can be said that 
sanctions from Western countries did not provide the best solution for improving human rights records in both 
countries. 
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2008).
17
 In comparison, Vietnam, another member of ASEAN, spent 20% on education and 8% 
on health in 2008 (ASEAN, 2009). This shows that the junta has failed in its responsibility to 
provide the people with human security – that is anything that affects people‘s quality of life. In 
the case of Myanmar, even security is not guaranteed due to the ongoing conflicts.
18
  
In 2009, the GDP per capita of Myanmar was US$ 465, and Myanmar was the poorest country in 
the ASEAN (ASEAN, 2009).
19
 Accurate figures for its military spending are not available, 
however several organisations including the Soros Foundation report that around 40 percent of 
its GDP is spent on military matters (―Burma Threatens Thailand's stability: Bangkok 
Governor‖, 2009). According to Roughneen from The Irrawaddy (2009), a Myanmarese 
newspaper based in Thailand, North Korea – another of the pariah states – spends on or around 
30%, which means therefore that the figure for Myanmar is very high. Lack of progress towards 
political reform, poor economic performance, and international sanctions have negatively 
contributed to the situation of Myanmar. The continued public protest and ethnic resistance have 
contributed to this as well. While the regime poured its budget into military expenditure, the 
other public sectors were negatively affected by limited resources, and thus the people‘s living 
conditions deteriorated. In contrast, it is pointed out that the military enjoy economic privileges 
and lucrative profits from arms and drug trafficking, and the smuggling of other natural 
resources, among other illicit economic activities (HRDU, 2007:32).
20
 
It is important to revisit some central political conjunctures in order to contextualise the state of 
Myanmar today. Beginning in 1962, when the government adopted the slogan, ―The Burmese 
                                                          
17
 Even though Vietnam has a two times higher GDP per capita, US$ 1053, than Myanmar, compared to other 
ASEAN member states, it belongs to the lower income group with Laos (US$ 918) and Cambodia (US$ 756). The 
GDP per capita of Singapore is US$ 37,692, that of Brunei Darussalam is US$ 35,623, and that of Malaysia is US$ 
7,920. The average of the ASEAN is US$ 2,577 (ASEAN, 2009). 
18
 The Human Development Report of 1994, addresses the concept of human security by redefining security as 
being primarily concerned with people and development. Human security is defined as ―the security of people, 
including their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity, and the protection of 
their human rights‖ (Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2008:581). 
19
 According to the IMF data in 2009, it was ranked 165
 
out of 180 countries in the world in terms of the GDP per 
capita (IMF, 2009). 
20
 When it comes to drug trafficking, it is said that in 1998 Myanmar produced 33% of the world‘s supply of Heroin. 
It is widely believed that the regime was involved in the production and trade thereof (HRDU, 2008:215). 
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Way to Socialism‖, it rapidly nationalised and assumed direct control of the economy. 21 
However, the regime could not make socio-economic progress as promised. This contributed to 
the dissatisfaction with the regime‘s performance, and led to economic protests. Charney 
(2009:147) argues that these economic protests were transformed into a political movement.  
In 1987, Ne Win declared that the government would push forward with economic reforms. 
However, these economic policies were misguided and haphazard. One of the prominent 
examples is that in 1987 the government pushed through the overnight demonetisation, which 
means ceasing to produce and circulate certain units of currency, at that time, 100, 75, 35 and 25 
Kyats. The problem was these were demonetised without compensation, leaving only 45 and 90 
Kyat notes (Haseman, 1988:223-224).
22
 In these circumstances, in 1988, wide protests spread 
throughout the country. This 8888 uprising was discussed in the previous section, but what 
should not be overlooked is that the fundamental reason for the uprising was this economic 
deterioration.  
It is often said that sanctions and other efforts to isolate the regime from international society 
negatively affected the ordinary people, and resulted in an increase in poverty (Seekins, 2005: 
440). For example, the US embargo during the 2000s targeted mainly the garment industry. 
Sanctions seriously damaged the garment industry, consisting mainly of small and medium-sized 
firms. The garment industry in Myanmar grew strongly throughout the 1990s. The garment 
export share of Myanmar‘s total exports increased from 2.5% in 1990 to 39.5% in 2000. Here the 
US was the largest market, absorbing 54.1% of Myanmar‘s garment exports in 2000 (Kudo, 
2008:998). Therefore, sanctions on the garment industry were expected to weaken the regime 
and encourage political change. However this policy resulted in social problems. For example, 
most of the employees were young females. Because of sanctions from the US, these workers 
lost their jobs and in order to provide income, they were often forced to resort to prostitution 
(Asia Society, 2010:67).  
                                                          
21
 The aim of the ―Burmese Way to Socialism‖ was to give Myanmar control over its economy. As a result of this, 
foreign businesses and banks were nationalised. An estimated 300,000 Indians and 100,000 Chinese participated in a 
large part of the economy left by Myanmar during the 1963-67 nationalisation programmes (Tarling, 1999:281). 
22
 As can be seen these two numbers can be divided by nine and several activists argue that Ne Win believed that 
these are his lucky numbers. Considering the characteristics of the autocratic regime, the leaders of which believe 
that personal power can be used to achieve personal enrichment or political goals, these arguments might be true. 
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Then, in August and September 2007 something took place that attracted much attention from 
the international community. At about this time, the sharp increase in food, fuel and commodity 
prices had upset the people. This triggered a series of protests led by students and opposition 
political activists. Later thousands of Buddhist monks joined the protests as well. It is said that 
since the fuel price had risen, many civilians were no longer able to support the monks in 
addition to their own families. That became the starting point of the participation of the Buddhist 
monks in anti-governmental protest. Considering that Buddhism play an integral role in 
Myanmar‘s predominantly Buddhist society, and understanding that governments regularly 
showed their homage to monks, the participation of the monks in the protest movement was 
significant (HRDU, 2007:74).
23
 Their participation served to legitimise and reinvigorate the 
protest movement. Some news reports referred to the protests as the ―Saffron Revolution‖ 
because of the colour of the monks‘ robes (Charney, 2009:196). The Myanmar government 
cracked down on the peaceful protest. There were numerous reports of monks being abused 
during arrest, interrogation and in detention (Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
At that time, the government controlled and blocked internet access and telecommunications. In 
other words, it monopolised all means of communication inside the country so that news of the 
repression could not be accessible outside of the country. However, at that time, a Japanese 
journalist was shot by a soldier and this was leaked by other journalists (―Blood Flows in Burma 
Revolt‖, 2007). The Japanese government and the Japanese media responded immediately after 
the crackdown and issued statements expressing their concern. Japan, Myanmar‘s largest foreign 
aid donor, donating about US$25 million in 2006, also cut aid to Myanmar in October 2007, 
following the death of this journalist (Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
There is a prominent example that shows how the economic deterioration became serious in 
Myanmar. In May 2008, Tropical Cyclone Nargis struck the coastline of Myanmar. This was the 
most catastrophic natural disaster in Myanmar‘s history and the second deadliest cyclone in the 
world‘s recorded history. According to the UN, more or less 2.4 million people from those areas 
were adversely affected by the cyclone. It has been estimated that at least 140,000 people died 
                                                          
23
 Actually, the successive regimes have sponsored Buddhism in Myanmar publicly. Nevertheless, monks are 
prohibited from participating in non-religious activities, that is political activities (HRDU, 2007:74). 
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and more or less one million were displaced (HRDU, 2008:i). When the international community 
wanted to help Myanmar, the SPDC rejected the offer for assistance. Offers from the UN were 
turned down and visas for aid workers were rejected. When foreign aid workers were eventually 
allowed into the country, they were not allowed access to the worst affected areas and relief 
supplies were misappropriated by the military. The government was criticised for not wanting to 
reveal how serious the situation was. Meanwhile, its people desperately needed help and were 
left without any protection (HRDU, 2008: 25). 
In the aftermath of this natural disaster, the Irrawaddy Delta, which produces most of Myanmar‘s 
rice, was largely destroyed. This massive destruction of farmland brought about food shortages, 
and commodity prices rose (Seekins, 2009:167). The devastation left many people, particularly 
children, in a desperate situation. There was reportedly a vast increase in the extent of human 
trafficking after Cyclone Nargis (HRDU, 2008:244). Cyclone victims in townships across 
Yangon were forced into unpaid reconstruction work. This means that many people were 
prevented from carrying out their normal work and, therefore, from earning any income (HRDU, 
2008:353).  
As discussed already, Myanmar has undergone severe political repression. Especially, ethnic 
minority groups which advocate segregation have suffered massive human rights abuses 
including large scale military action accompanied by killings, torture, rape, and other kinds of 
violence. Also the regime repressed the political opposition party by banning political activities 
and placing the opposition leader under house arrest for decades. At the same time, the 
mismanagement of economic policies by the regime, such as nationalisation, demonetisation, and 
heavy spending on military matters which resulted in the deterioration of the other public sector, 
paralysed the whole economy of the country. Sanctions which were imposed by the West aiming 
to improve the human rights situation could not succeed, but rather made ordinary people‘s lives 
even worse. The public discontent resulting from these, fuelled anti-government movements. To 
counter this, the regime‘s responses became utterly ruthless. All these situations finally made the 
ASEAN member states involve themselves in improving the situation of Myanmar. 
 
35 
 
3-3. Strategic Calculation 
Myanmar has been under military governments for more than half a century. The BSPP, the 
SLORC and the SPDC have maintained power by force. As a result of the demand for political 
change and improvement of economic conditions, these regimes promised a new constitution. 
However, these promises were repeatedly unfulfilled. During this process, the international 
community also repeatedly imposed sanctions, which led to further hardship for ordinary people. 
It is possible to observe that Myanmar is unable to protect its people. The regimes have failed to 
provide not only physical security, but people have also been suffering from hunger and been 
denied basic rights, fundamental human dignity. Considering the government in Myanmar‘s 
unwillingness and lack of capacity, the responsibility falls beyond a single state. In such 
circumstances, in order to advance human rights, the role of neighbouring countries as well as 
the regional organisation is essential. In this section, the response from and policies of 
Myanmar‘s neighbouring countries, and ASEAN will be analysed. Considering that the case of 
Myanmar is intricately linked with the interests of other states, how did the interests of other 
states evolve, and how and to what extent did they end up intervening? In order to answer the 
above question, it is important to consider the process of socialisation. The steps leading to full 
socialisation include: strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion.  
3-3-1. States’ Self-interest and the Non-intervention Norm in Southeast 
Asia  
Before discussing the socialisation process in detail, it is important to discuss impediments to 
socialisation. One of the major obstacles was the fact that neighbouring states were very 
concerned with their own self-interest. They were reluctant to interfere if this was incompatible 
with their own interests. Narine (1998:195) criticises this behaviour of member states as a 
―narrow understanding of self-interest‖, which has led to disunity in ASEAN and has interfered 
with its function. Narine (2002:31) takes  his argument further and says that ASEAN followed a 
policy of ―cautious diplomacy‖. For example, difficult issues such as conflicts were dealt with by 
postponing discussion. As a result, ASEAN was not able to resolve as many issues as it should 
have. 
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Several incidents show how ASEAN member states pursued their own interests despite the 
serious deterioration of the human rights situation in Myanmar. Thailand is criticised because it 
allowed the military of Myanmar to use Thai territory during operations against the Karen‘s 
armed resistance so that their relationship with Myanmar would not deteriorate (Moller, 
1998:1089). Here, it should be noted that Thailand was one of Myanmar‘s largest trade partners, 
buying 44% of Myanmar‘s exports during 2001-2005 (Alamgir, 2008:986). Malaysia was the 
first ASEAN country to send an ambassador to Myanmar. The motive was trade with Myanmar 
as well. Other member states of ASEAN such as Singapore and Indonesia were also interested in 
trade with Myanmar, as they regard Myanmar as a new market (Narine, 2002:114). Considering 
that most of the businesses and banks in Myanmar are owned by the regime, neighbouring states 
have to curry favour with the regime in order to be granted business opportunities. Neighbouring 
states‘ economic interests were prioritised at the cost of human rights. 
Cheeppensook (2007:1) points to the social and economic backlash from the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis as one of impediments to improving the human rights situation in Myanmar. 
Before the crisis, the ASEAN member states were more likely to accept the ―human-centric‖ or 
―human-security‖ norm of the international community. External pressure from other 
international organisations such as the UN and the EU played an important role in inducing 
norms supporting human security in ASEAN. Furthermore, NGOs and academics, that is so-
called ―norm entrepreneurs‖, have attempted to convince states to embrace new norms. The 
Manila Declaration (1987) and the Singapore Declaration (1992) show that the ASEAN 
encouraged wide involvement and participation of NGOs (Aviel, 2000). Both emphasised the 
involvement of NGOs especially in the area of human rights, specifically the area of women, 
youth and the environment. However, the financial crisis made member states concentrate on 
their own domestic problems. Also, it is said that the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US negatively 
affected ASEAN member states, which following the event reverted to being state-centric in 
their approach, which means that the states narrowed the scope of security. The concept of 
security was now limited to protecting their citizens against external threats only. Despite the 
general commitment to human rights protection over the years, the 9/11 terrorism attacks proved 
that national security came before human-security (Cheeppensook, 2007:15). Most of the 
countries in Southeast Asia have been criticised for wanting to maintain their status quo in the 
fast-changing international environment (Asia Society, 2010:108). For these reasons, ASEAN 
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could not take collective action to bring about political change and improvement in the human 
condition of the people.  
ASEAN and member states have kept to the non-intervention norm. It is noted that the principle 
of Thailand‘s foreign policy is ―not making enemies out of next-door neighbours.‖ (Asia Society, 
2010:106). Also, the former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, said, ―we can talk about 
certain problems that are transnational in nature. But if we start talking about how a country must 
run affairs like democratisation and human rights, then we are getting into trouble‖ (Katsumata, 
2004:251). On the basis of these embedded ideas of non-intervention, states promoted their 
ability to act separately. Traditional rivalry also promoted the norm of non-intervention. For 
example, there were territorial/ethnic disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and 
Singapore and Malaysia and the Philippines. This can be confirmed by Konfrontasi. In contrast, 
there is solidarity between the members of SADC, mostly because the liberation movements 
helped one another during the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles (see Section 4-4-1). 
Narine (2002:196) suggests that the hostility between member states of ASEAN adversely 
affected a sense of regional solidarity and played a role in their non-intervention in the human 
rights abuses in Myanmar. 
Nevertheless, recently, ASEAN and its member states have realised the importance of resolving 
the human rights crisis in Myanmar and they have tried to change Myanmar‘s behaviour by 
opening the country to the international community. Especially, Thailand and the Philippines 
advocated changes in ASEAN‘s traditional diplomacy. In 1998, then Foreign Minister of 
Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan, suggested that ASEAN review the existing non-intervention norm. 
This proposal of so-called ―flexible engagement‖ showed that the traditional behaviour of 
ASEAN was being challenged and can be seen as the starting point of socialisation (see Section 
3-4-1).
24
 It is however criticised when ASEAN member states had human rights initiatives that, 
although many measures were taken, member states focused on improving their own national 
image rather than resolving the root causes of the crises (Robinson, 1996:75; Jones, 2007:6). 
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 Initially, many objections to flexible engagement emerged from almost all ASEAN member states. The proposal 
for flexible engagement was subsequently toned down to an ―enhanced interaction‖; its remaining non-intervention 
norm was eventually adopted by ASEAN (Haacke, 1999:598). 
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3-3-2. Rewards and Punishments 
In this section the focus will be on what kinds of rewards and punishments have been given by 
ASEAN. Also, the reason why ASEAN decided to include Myanmar in ASEAN and the process 
followed will be discussed. Even though its neighbouring states were interested in trade, mostly 
bilateral, with Myanmar, its economic collapse under the military regime offered the ASEAN 
member states little economic motivation for engagement (Zaw, 2001:38). However, ASEAN 
realised that in order to remain competitive and attractive as an investment area, its enlargement 
to include all of Southeast Asia was imperative. As a result of this calculation, the inclusion of 
Myanmar and other two countries, Cambodia and Laos, was considered (Ott, 1998:71).  
It should be noted that membership of the EU was one of the incentives that led the former 
communist states in Eastern Europe to conform to the new norm of democracy. This can also be 
applied to the case of ASEAN and Myanmar. Since the early 1990s Myanmar was interested in 
joining ASEAN, however, other member states were concerned about Myanmar‘s human rights 
situation. Therefore, it was important that the regime in Myanmar demonstrate an improvement 
of the country‘s human rights situation. To do so, the regime released Aung San Suu Kyi after 
six years of house arrest. This action accelerated the process of Myanmar‘s being accepted as a 
member of ASEAN (Zaw, 2001:42). Especially, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia were very 
much in favour of Myanmar‘s membership of ASEAN. As early as 1992, Thailand suggested 
that ASEAN invite Myanmar to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) as an observer. Narine 
(2002:112) points out that Thailand wanted to exercise its political and economic influence in 
mainland Southeast Asia by including new members located in mainland Southeast Asia.
25
 It is 
true that Thailand is geographically surrounded by new ASEAN member states such as 
Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, and that by including these countries in ASEAN, it can ease their 
security problems. At that time, former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, of Malaysia 
expressed the hope that ASEAN would include all Southeast Asian countries by 2000 in order to 
enhance its status in international relations (Narine, 2002:115; Katanyuu, 2006:835). Narine 
(2002:119) points out that the reason was related to the political leaders‘ personal ambition as 
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 Southeast Asia is divided into mainland and island areas. Mainland Southeast Asia consists of Myanmar, 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and it is actually an extension of the Asian continent. Island Southeast Asia 
includes Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, and East Timor (Asia Society, 2010). 
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well. Narine argues that for President Suharto and Mahatir, ―unification of Southeast Asia‖ was 
part of their political achievement, and their own personal international reputation was 
considered.  
For Indonesia and Malaysia, the persecution of the Muslim minority in Myanmar was another 
major concern. When the regime in Myanmar took a soft stance that included the repatriation of 
Muslims in Bangladesh (see Footnote 12), this helped the regime gain acceptance from Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Singapore‘s support for Myanmar‘s admission into ASEAN was based on a 
different set of concerns. It is said that Singapore had little interest in human rights issues and no 
real objections to the regime‘s human rights abuses. At that time Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand created favourable conditions for Myanmar‘s membership and as Singapore 
traditionally enjoyed friendly relations with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, it supported 
Myanmar‘s admission as well (Zaw, 2001:43).  
For Myanmar, joining ASEAN would lead to increased investment and provide protection from 
Western condemnation by achieving legitimacy (Fink, 2001:234). All in all, Myanmar‘s 
admission to ASEAN accelerated existing member states‘ aspirations of creating a stronger 
organisation. Myanmar itself gained political and economic benefits.  
There is another reason that influenced the process of granting membership of ASEAN to 
Myanmar. It is said that ASEAN and its member states were afraid of Chinese influence in 
Myanmar. If ASEAN had left Myanmar out of the regional organisation, the relationship 
between China and Myanmar would have become closer. This is related to member states‘ 
political and economic considerations (Arendshorst, 2009:110). It is pointed out that ASEAN 
feared excluding Myanmar because China might seize its chance to play a more prominent role 
in Myanmar. Bunyanunda (2002:123) says that ―ASEAN states wanted to prevent Myanmar 
from becoming under China‘s indirect influence and becoming a Chinese satellite state‖. 
Bunyanunda (2002:128) adds that ASEAN focused on preventing Chinese hegemony in 
Southeast Asia.  
Traditionally, Myanmar and China have been close. Even though there was a boundary dispute 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the boundary agreement was favourable to Myanmar. This may be 
because China needed an ally at that time. In the 1990s China‘s military assistance was important 
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to Myanmar. Also, infrastructure development projects were supported by the Chinese, including 
the construction of a road and railways (Shee, 2002). Recently, when the international 
community attempted to put pressure on Myanmar, China, as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, insisted that the situation in Myanmar did not constitute a threat to 
international security.  
While ASEAN tried to keep out Chinese influence in the region, by including new members, it 
seems that there is little evidence that SADC member states will unite to oppose China. This is 
seen differently in the context of Southern Africa. At the moment, no SADC member state has 
any reason to turn down Chinese material support. Also ideologically, some Southern African 
countries formerly had communist-oriented governments or Marxist-leading political parties in 
power while ASEAN was concerned with ―communist insurgencies‖ and regarded communism 
as an external threat in the region. One should not overlook the fact that, at the moment, China‘s 
involvement in these two countries can be decisive for these two regimes‘ survival (see Footnote 
16). This can however have a negative effect on the improvement of human rights. 
In July 1996, Myanmar became an official observer at ASEAN meetings and a member of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (ASEAN, 2010). This set the stage for Myanmar to become a 
member a year later. In addition to ASEAN‘s political and economic calculation, as mentioned 
previously, Malaysia and Indonesia hoped that the treatment of Muslims in Myanmar would 
improve. However, this did not happen. ASEAN also believed that a policy of isolation and 
pressure through sanctions on the regime would heighten its domestic insecurity. It was believed 
that more effective results could be gained through rewards by the ASEAN (Bunyanunda, 
2002:123). However, as some scholars point out, this led to more brutal repression within 
Myanmar and the situation became worse (Tin Maung Maung Than, 2001; Zaw, 2001).  
Especially Zaw (2001) argues that after its admission, contrary to ASEAN‘s expectation that 
membership of the association would lead to Myanmar‘s behaving more responsibly, the regime 
has stepped up its campaign of repression against the opposition and against ethnic groups. It 
seems that admission to ASEAN was seen as a sign of approval for its policies by Myanmar, and 
the human rights situation has become worse. Therefore, in reality, the reward given to 
Myanmar, namely membership of the regional organisation, did not have a fruitful outcome as 
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was anticipated. Furthermore, Myanmar hosted several meetings of ASEAN and used these 
meetings to improve its international image and increase its legitimacy. Another criticism is that 
membership brought economic opportunities that have helped Myanmar survive despite Western 
sanctions (McCarthy, 2006:423). Through these cases, it can be seen that behaviour resulting 
from strategic calculation can be short-lived and recanted once rewards have been given 
(Warkotsch, 2008:242). 
After granting membership of ASEAN to Myanmar, neighbouring countries have not taken 
collective action against Myanmar, despite the human rights situation worsening. However, 
ASEAN arrived at a consensus in 2005 (Katanyuu, 2006:827). The member states blocked the 
regime from taking up the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006, which shows that Myanmar 
was under pressure from ASEAN. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who succeeded Mahathir as Prime 
Minister in 2003, allowed Malaysian parliamentarians to raise the issue of blocking Myanmar 
from taking the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006. This spread to parliamentarians from Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand, and finally resulted in the establishment of the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Caucus on Burma (AIPMC). The AIPMC, a network formed by and for 
Parliamentarians from the ASEAN countries, had the aim of advocating for human rights and 
democratic reform in Myanmar (AIPMC, 2008). This confirms what Checkel (2005:811) said, 
namely that foreign policy-makers can play important roles when they work together and share 
ideas. Here, also what should be noted is that two different mechanisms, strategic calculation and 
role-playing, can work simultaneously. 
As a result of this collective action, the junta had to give up the chairmanship and Myanmar 
announced that it needed to focus on national reconciliation and the democratisation process. It 
gave this as the reason for not taking up the chairmanship. ASEAN showed its gratitude, saying 
―sincere appreciation to the government of Myanmar for not allowing its national preoccupation 
to affect ASEAN‘s solidarity and cohesiveness‖ in a joint Communiqué during a Ministerial 
Meeting in 2005 (ASEAN, 2005). It still can be seen that the ASEAN and its member states 
considered the international reputation of the regional organisation important. Singapore‘s Prime 
Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, stated that ASEAN ―would become marginalised if it delayed or 
took no action regarding Myanmar‘s ambition to take up the chairmanship‖ (Katanyuu, 
2006:839). Jones (2010) argues that ASEAN‘s action towards some regional issues are related to 
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ASEAN‘s consideration of its ―image‖, ―credibility‖ and ―reputation‖. Since ASEAN granted 
membership to Myanmar, the US and the EU have been condemning this. These powerful actors, 
the US and the EU, have pressed ASEAN as a whole to adopt sanctions and to put pressure on 
Myanmar. Even though in 1997 the EU took strong action canceling scheduled meetings with 
ASEAN, Myanmar nevertheless gained membership of ASEAN. However, ASEAN realised that 
such boycotts would have a serious impact on its relations with these major actors in 
international relations (Katanyuu, 2006:843). After the financial crisis, member states looked for 
financial support from other institutions such as the IMF, and ASEAN faced pressure to accept 
democracy and human rights. This can also be seen as a starting point for ASEAN and its 
member states to pay serious attention to the new norm of humanitarian intervention (Jones, 
2010). 
3-4. Role-Playing 
In this section, another mechanism that can result in socialisation, that is role-playing, will be 
discussed. In the process of socialisation, states adopt certain roles because they are appropriate 
in that particular setting (Checkel, 2005:810). Here, regional organisations can play an important 
role by providing cues and a suitable environment for actors to play their roles. Here, Checkel 
(2005:811) puts emphasis on policy decision-makers. As seen in Section 3-3-2, each member 
states‘ parliamentarians spoke out on the issue of human rights in Myanmar and it soon became a 
regional issue. Then, related legal frameworks were created. These legal frameworks were 
originally aimed at Myanmar, but other member states had to conform if they belonged to 
ASEAN. Eventually this process contributed to improving the human rights situation in the 
region as a whole. As another aspect, Checkel (2005:811) states that it is crucial to have those 
who have previous experience in solving similar issues in regional organisations. In the case of 
ASEAN, there had been few incidents requiring collective actions by member states in the past. 
Katsumata (2004:241) suggests that the environmental problem of burning forests in Indonesia in 
1997-1998 brought about change in the traditional diplomacy of the ASEAN, namely non-
interference. In order to resolve this transnational problem, states had to discuss each other‘s 
internal affairs. Taking these elements into consideration, this section will examine how ASEAN 
reached the phase of role-playing.  
43 
 
3-4-1. The Creation of a Communicative Environment  
For role-playing to be successful, long and sustained interaction between member states within 
the organisation is needed. In the post-Cold War era, Southeast Asia‘s regional environment 
specially regarding security, changed significantly. In the past, the security environment of 
Southeast Asia can be characterised as follows: First of all, externally, member states were 
―against communism‖. Also, among member states, there were several disputes such as 
Konfrontasi, which was discussed in Section 3-3-1. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to 
expect regional cooperation. However, the post-Cold War era reinforced the commitment of 
ASEAN member states to their own regional organisation. The countries believed that through 
larger organisations they could enhance their political influence (Narine, 1998:208-209). 
ASEAN realised that it needed to respond to the great powers as a united bloc. Later, ASEAN 
even chose to embrace China, Japan and South Korea through ASEAN+3. Also there were 
regular meetings with the EU as a form of Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which enhanced the 
institutional feature of ASEAN. In particular, this interaction with the EU helped socialise 
ASEAN regarding human rights. It was also exposed to pressure from the EU through regular 
ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings, and it started seeking for advanced mechanisms for solving 
human rights issues.  
The improvement of the socio-economic situation in Southeast Asia cannot be overlooked. For 
many political leaders in this region, economic development was the fundamental goal, while 
political and civil rights had been neglected in the past (Apodaca, 2002:887). After many 
countries in Southeast Asia achieved successful economic growth, one of the results was that a 
middle class emerged in this region. This created considerable social change in the region. This 
middle class posed an ideological challenge to the authoritarian norms (Kraft, 2001:36).  
Actually, the behaviour of the middle class differed according to the time period. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the middle classes were willing to support the authoritarian political frameworks 
because the authoritarian regime acquired legitimacy by achieving economic development. Also, 
as Robinson and Goodman (1996:13) argue, around this time, the middle classes were weak and 
fragmented. That is the reason why even though the dictators were overthrown in Indonesia in 
1966, and in Thailand in 1973, the middle classes were not strong enough to establish 
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democracy, and the result was that another form of authoritarianism emerged. However, as time 
went by, the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes dissolved in the face of the challenge posed by 
the ―new‖ middle class. In the late 1980s, the growing middle class became more educated and 
increasingly engaged in more professional areas than in the past; consequently, their 
characteristics differed from people those of middle class people in the 1960s and 1970s. As 
Funston (2001:418) argues, these middle classes turned their attention to human rights issues in 
their own countries and in neighbouring countries. This became one of the factors contributing to 
the creation of a communicative environment that makes it possible to discuss human rights in 
this region.  
As mentioned, a prerequisite for favourable conditions for role-playing is ―extensive previous 
professional experience‖. Indonesia‘s forest fires have already been mentioned in this regard. 
Another occasion for acquiring this experience was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 
1978. According to Narine (2002), this incident contributed to the strengthening of ASEAN‘s 
unity. At that time, ASEAN actively lobbied at the UN for resolutions calling for Vietnam's 
withdrawal from Cambodia (Hussey, 1991:96). By resolving the case successfully, ASEAN 
learned to act as a coherent diplomatic unit (Narine, 1998:208; Narine, 2002:61). Jones (2010) 
even argues that this proves that a history of intervention existed in ASEAN. As a result of this, 
ASEAN turned out to be an effective instrument for managing regional issues, pursuing not only 
individual but also collective interests. Kurus (1993:822) argues that this experience could have 
contributed to the creation of a strong sense of ―mutual understanding‖, ―trust‖ and 
―predictability‖ among others. This experience could have encouraged ASEAN member states to 
sort out their regional problems like the Myanmar issue later on, in a integrative manner.  
There are other reasons why each member country has been outspoken on the issue of Myanmar. 
As mentioned in Section 3-3-2, Thailand wanted to extend its political influence. As a result, 
Thailand joined various international organisations, including the Human Security Network 
(HSN). The HSN was launched as ―an informal group of countries sharing the goal of 
encouraging the resolution of international issues that present an immediate threat to human 
security‖ (HSN, 2010). This organisation contributed to peacekeeping operations in different 
regions around the world. This experience became an important source, helping Thailand to 
resolve the human rights issues in its own region as well (Acharya, 2001:16). 
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Since 2003, the Philippines has taken a more outspoken stance on the issue in Myanmar. It is 
said that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo seems to be particularly sympathetic to Aung San 
Suu Kyi and to democracy-building in Myanmar. The Philippines itself has experienced 
substantial progress in the negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) which claims an independent Islamic state in the Southern Philippines (Katanyuu, 
2006:833).
26
 Given this success, the Philippines might want to encourage Myanmar to enter into 
a dialogue with ethnic minorities.  
Based on these experiences, Thailand and the Philippines called for a rethinking of ASEAN‘s 
commitment to non-intervention in its members‘ affairs. In the end, the new norm, ―flexible 
engagement‖ was introduced (Fink, 2001:55). 27  In 1998, then Thai Foreign Minister, Surin 
Pitsuwan, introduced the concept of ―flexible engagement‖ as an alternative to constructive 
engagement. The aim was to promote political openness and transparency and to encourage the 
norm of humanitarian intervention and democratisation. The idea was to allow ASEAN member 
states to publicly comment on each other‘s domestic matters. This flexible engagement is 
considered one of the most important challenges to ASEAN‘s non-intervention norm (Acharya, 
2004:261). The advocates of this concept rejected the notion that ASEAN members had no right 
to criticise each other‘s domestic politics (Zaw, 2001:42). It can be said that a new environment 
favourable to spawning a new norm at the initial stage had been created. 
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 The MILF is the largest group battling for self-rule in Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines. The 
Muslims account for about 8% of the total population of the Philippines, they are concentrated in Mindanao. As a 
result of ongoing conflicts between the government and MILF, at least 125,000 have been killed in the Muslim 
insurgency in Mindanao (Tarling, 1999:97). However, in March 2007, the Philippine government offered to 
recognize human rights for the Moro people which it had never done before. The government and the MILF have 
steadily strengthened the peace process and in 2010, they reached ceasefire and peace agreement (―Philippines 
Keeps Malaysia as MILF peace talks host‖, 2010). 
27
 Actually, in 1992, Foreign Minister of Thailand, Arsa Sarasin, suggested ―constructive engagement‖. The 
character of this constructive engagement is a combination of a kind of ―quiet diplomacy and increased economic 
relations‖ which can entice the regime in Myanmar to reform (Narine, 2002:115). It was proposed as a better 
approach than sanctions which were chosen by Western states. However, not only ASEAN member states but also 
Myanmar rejected this, urging it was intended to interfere with Myanmar‘s domestic politics (Narine, 2002:116). In 
the case of Zimbabwe, constructive engagement which included aid packages was introduced by South Africa. This 
was also turned down by Zimbabwe. Both Myanmar and Zimbabwe were strongly opposed to this policy aimed at 
their political reform and refused to cooperate.  
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Regarding its relationship with Myanmar, Indonesia‘s position is intriguing. Before President 
Suharto‘s fall in 1998, Indonesia was an important supporter of Myanmar‘s regime. In addition 
to the leaders‘ personal closeness, the military regimes in Myanmar looked to Indonesia as a 
model of how a military regime could maintain control. However, with the collapse of military 
rule, Indonesia took up a different position. Successive presidents wanted to reform existing 
authoritarianism. For example, President Jusuf Habibie undertook numerous political reforms. 
As one of these, he released political prisoners. President Abdurrahman Wahid abolished the 
Ministry of Information, the Suharto's regime‘s chief instrument for controlling the media 
(Barton, 2002). This meant that Myanmar no longer had a political ally which supported the 
military regime in the region (Fink, 2001:55).  
At the 11th ASEAN Summit held in Malaysia in December 2005, ASEAN urged the regime to 
release political prisoners and expedite democratic reforms. It can be seen that ASEAN departed 
from its tradition of non-intervention by criticising Myanmar openly (Katanyuu, 2006:839). 
Katanyuu (2006:839) also emphasises that ASEAN member states have maintained lines of 
communication with each other. This means that ASEAN has also significantly improved its 
internal relationships despite the traditional rivalry of the member states. ASEAN has 
encouraged member states to push Myanmar into dialogue regarding the ending of human rights 
violations. Nevertheless, Narine (1998:208) evaluates that a sense of regional collective identity 
has not yet developed. Favourable conditions for both ASEAN and Myanmar to adopt a logic of 
appropriateness, which means that human rights values are entirely embedded and thus become 
an unconscious habit in the region, have not yet been provided. However, the importance of the 
seed of change in this region cannot be ignored. 
3-4-2. The Establishment of Mechanisms to Protect Human Rights  
It is said that norms supporting human rights in ASEAN began to emerge from 1993 onwards, 
when the World Conference on Human Rights forced ASEAN member states to take a strong 
stance regarding human rights issues in the region.
28
 At the Regional Meeting for Asia of the 
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 The World Conference on Human Rights was held by the UN in Vienna, Austria, on 14 to 25 June 1993. It was 
the first human rights conference held since the end of the Cold War. The main result of the conference was the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and this reaffirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the United Nations Charter (UNHR Council, 1995). 
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World Conference on Human Rights, ASEAN member states enforced the 1993 Bangkok 
Declaration on Human Rights. This endorsed the idea that there should be a regional human 
rights mechanism in Southeast Asia. This was a starting point showing that the ASEAN was 
concerned about establishing a regional mechanism regarding human rights (Cheeppensook, 
2007:9). After this, it is noticeable that the communicative environment of human rights in 
Southeast Asia was extensively improved. Furthermore, considering that ASEAN had not had 
any human rights standards before, this was a remarkable change. 
One of characteristics of ASEAN is that it formerly worked through the political leaders‘ 
personal relationships. However, since 2000, ASEAN intergovernmental organisations hold 
more than 230 meetings a year. This shows that the institutions are working in a more 
transparent manner (Narine, 2002:31). Narine (2002:31) also emphasises that ASEAN now 
makes certain government-to-government contacts possible on a regular basis. Through this 
process, more interaction has brought about more trust among members. Therefore the regional 
organisation has helped to create a more communicative environment.  
Also, numerous NGOs are involved in ASEAN and they enhance ―social linkage‖ in the region 
and play a role in advancing a more human-centric agenda in ASEAN. Regarding the creation of 
an environment which makes it possible to discuss human rights, the existence of NGOs has led 
to more opportunities for interaction and contributed to making interaction intensive and 
extensive. The socialisation process does not take place only through the interaction between 
member states and the institutions, but also through states‘ social interaction with NGOs which 
aim to persuade states to internalise alternative norms. Here, transnational NGOs play important 
roles as one of the important sources of new ideas, norms and identities (Cheeppensook, 2007:5). 
Through this institutional development, the norms can be more easily spread than before. This 
institutional development can help ease constraints between neighbouring states. Considering 
that several ASEAN member states are not yet democratic, the importance of regional 
organisations and the role of ASEAN will be essential. 
The AHRB became a serious possibility in October 2003, when ASEAN leaders issued the ―The 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II‖, also known as ―Bali Concord II‖. It is said that ASEAN 
subscribed to ―the notion of democratic peace, which means all member countries believe 
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democratic processes will promote regional peace and stability. Also, the non-democratic 
members all agreed that it was something all member states should aspire to‖. The subsequent 
2004 ―Vientiane Action Program‖ (VAP) set out a broad framework for what an ASEAN 
community should look like (Munro, 2009:4). It is said that the VAP provided more flesh to the 
idea by identifying norms, principles, and projects that would help realise the pillars of 
community-building in ASEAN (Morada, 2008:40).
29
 
In December 2005, ASEAN leaders decided to draft an ASEAN Charter.  
The adoption of the Charter is seen as a major step forward in the process of establishing the 
AHRB (Hao Duy Phan, 2008:12). The Charter includes international humanitarian law and the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. As discussed, ASEAN formerly emphasised informal 
decision-making by a small elite network. Now non-consensus based decision-making, which is 
totally opposite to the traditional way of decision-making, is introduced.
30
 Sanctions against 
erring members, including the option of expulsion from the organisation are also included 
(Morada, 2008:43). This process shows that a communicative environment can have a desirable 
outcome. ASEAN and its member states can give guidance to member states and various other 
actors and make them think harder about the benefits of human rights norms. This will be 
conducive to socialisation. It is impossible to calculate the cost and benefit of every policy option 
but the adoption of certain principles and the establishment of the AHRB means that there will 
be guidelines that can simply be followed. By establishing the AHRB, it is now possible for 
ASEAN to set adequate human rights standards in the region. This new mechanism can regulate 
its member states‘ actions. 
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 The VAP identified several areas of cooperation among states, such as: 1) political development, where ASEAN 
members‘ leaders are expected to promote ―shared vision and common values‖; 2) shaping and sharing of norms 
that, among other things, ―contribute to the building of a democratic, tolerant, participatory, and transparent 
Community in Southeast Asia‖; 3) conflict prevention through confidence building and preventive diplomacy; 4) 
conflict resolution through ―the use of existing regional dispute settlement mechanisms and processes in the political 
and security areas‖; and 5) post-conflict peace building that includes the establishment of appropriate mechanisms 
and resource mobilization (Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, 2007). 
30
 The highest decision-making body of the ASEAN is the ASEAN summit which is generally held annually, 
allowing the heads of government of each country to discuss and resolve regional issues. Voting takes place when 
required. The system is that one country has one vote and that a simple majority is required. However, decisions are 
commonly taken during informal discussions and are heavily dependent on the personal relations of top leaders. In 
this process, it is said that consensus is required to draw conclusions (Chiou, 2009). 
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Despite these achievements, two main problems still remain. A survey shows that civil society is 
not satisfied with the process of the AHRB. It is pointed out that the civil society sector obtained 
information about the process from each other in informal ways rather than from the ASEAN 
Secretariat (Hao Duy Phan, 2009:476). This shows that a perfect communicative environment 
has not been created, and this will make it difficult for ASEAN to move on to the phase of 
normative suasion, or full socialisation. 
The creation of the AHRB also divided ASEAN member states into two camps. Those in favour 
included Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore (Munro, 2009:13). 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam opposed the AHRB, claiming that they were not ready for such a 
body (Munro, 2009:15). This shows not only disagreement but also that even among member 
states, there is still uneven improvement regarding human rights. In reality, except for Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand, none of the other members of ASEAN meet the criteria of 
―democracy‖. Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar are all ―not free‖ according to 
Freedom House data (Freedom House, 2009). Although Malaysia and Singapore are quasi-
democratic, there has been no change in the governing party in either country for decades 
(Munro, 2009:12). Within ASEAN, opinions on how to deal with Myanmar are split between the 
older member states and the newer member states, and also between democratic and non-
democratic states (Asia Society, 2010:85). So far, ASEAN has had difficulty in shaping a 
collective identity. To some extent, it is possible to say the situation of Myanmar may contribute 
to the other member states‘ speaking with one voice. However, seeing that some of the countries 
are not yet fully democratic and do not conform to the norm of human rights, this is not likely.  
At this stage of role-playing, it can be seen that ASEAN member states are still ―boundedly 
rational‖ which means that states do not yet take the human rights norm as for granted. 
Hopefully, the repeated habit of compliance within the social setting created by ASEAN will 
help the member states of the ASEAN to conform to the new norm of human rights without 
calculations. In the process, the newly adopted legal framework can be expected to play a 
guiding role. 
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3-5. Normative Suasion 
It seems that individual member states and ASEAN have been taking steps away from inactive 
attitudes and are starting to accept their new role initiated by environmental triggers. The 
establishment of the AHRB is expected to provide ―a new venue‖ and ―a new learning process‖ 
which can help the ASEAN member states to cooperate on human rights at the regional level 
(Chalermpalanupap, 2009:6). Nevertheless, it will take some time for Myanmar and also other 
ASEAN member states to perceive this norm of human rights as ―taken-for-granted‖.  
Acharya (2004:244) stresses that Southeast Asian countries have been active norm borrowers 
and localisers. According to Acharya (2004:248-249), when a foreign norm, Western human 
rights norm in this case, seeks to replace a local norm, recipients, that is ASEAN and its member 
states, may be fearful and resistant and feel that the new norm challenges the legitimacy and 
authority of their own leaders. Therefore, they are likely to localise the new norm rather than 
accept it wholesale. There is the possibility that ASEAN member states will adapt human rights 
norms to suit their own needs and values. When these countries become democratic it will be 
easier to converge their interests regarding human rights norms.
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Looking inwards, McCarthy (2006:428) argues that the military regime in Myanmar has made 
the people fearful of punishment or political retaliation regarding speaking out and giving their 
own political opinions. As a result of sanctions, the people are also unlikely to trust foreign 
influence. Political apathy derived from repressive regimes and a sense of difference towards 
Western norms such as democracy and human rights are likely to hamper the norm‘s localisation 
in Myanmar.  
According to a report in Asia Society (2010:53), a non-profit education organisation aiming at 
deepening understanding in Asia, some countries still prefer the bilateral approach, rather than 
ASEAN-driven approaches. More specifically, they still believe that bilateral approaches have a 
better chance of persuading the regime in Myanmar to relax, while most other countries consider 
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 Schimmelfennig (2005) argues that EU and NATO membership brought about norm‘s socialisation in norm-
violating countries in Central and Eastern European countries. Particularly, Schimmelfennig confirms that 
membership incentives worked where governments were liberal democracies. This can be applied to the case of 
ASEAN and SADC. If these member states become democratised, it will be easier to adjust the states‘ interests with 
the human rights norm.  
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that ASEAN should take a leading role in addressing the situation in Myanmar. All these issues 
can be barriers to resolving Myanmar‘s human rights crisis. 
At the moment, it can be seen that ASEAN has achieved the stages of norm emergence and 
cascade as identified in the norm cycle. However, what should follow is the completion of the 
phase of socialisation. This can be considered as consolidation or universalisation. Despite 
different strategic and economic interests, countries from Southeast Asia should be able to share 
a common interest in a peaceful and prosperous Myanmar.  
3-6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the focus was on Myanmar‘s human rights situation. Then the regional response 
was analysed using the three mechanisms of socialisation: namely, strategic calculation, role 
playing and normative suasion. Initially, by granting membership of ASEAN, ASEAN and 
member states believed that the situation in Myanmar would be improved. However, this 
resulted in an adverse outcome in that this membership only strengthened Myanmar‘s legitimacy 
in the international community. However, as a form of punishment, ASEAN blocked Myanmar‘s 
chairmanship in 2006. It was imperative for Myanmar to restore its relationship with 
neighbouring countries, therefore it gave up the chairmanship and established a new constitution 
in 2008 to ensure that the military cannot exert its power on  the legislative process (Asia 
Society, 2010:10). Myanmar is also planning to hold an election in November 2010. The 
outcome will be a significant indicator for measuring whether its human rights situation has 
changed or not. 
Regarding regional organisations, by actively interacting, member states have established a 
regional human rights mechanism, namely the AHRB. The degree of adaptation and compromise 
shown throughout the process of creating this human rights body was discussed. The dynamics 
of international pressures and the inclusion of NGOs were elaborated. The full socialisation 
process has however not been completed.  
When it comes to socialisation, the initial focus during the research is to examine the role of 
regional organisations as socialisers. It is evident that ASEAN and its member states have put 
effort into solving the regional issues by playing an inducing role. Here, it can be seen that 
52 
 
ASEAN itself is being socialised as well over time. The organisation did not have a perfect 
record for human rights, so it would have been beyond its capacity to socialise Myanmar in the 
past. As discussed already, ASEAN member states have been through the process of 
democratisation and improvement of human rights. Also, through interaction with Western 
actors such as the EU and transnational human rights NGOs, socialisers in the region have also 
become the subject of socialisation and can in turn influence ASEAN. When all actors are 
constantly subject to normative suasion, new norms may result, and these will affect how the 
actors define and redefine their interests.  
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4. Zimbabwe and SADC 
4-1. Introduction 
The parliamentary election in 2000 is regarded as the first election in which Mugabe's regime 
faced a serious challenge from the opposition political party. At that time, the newly formed 
MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai won 57 of the 120 elected seats, while the ZANU-PF, the 
governing party led by President Mugabe, won 63 seats. This led to strong opposition in 
parliament against the ZANU-PF‘s unilateral manoeuvre. In other words, the political arena 
which had been dominated by the ZANU-PF for decades now could be challenged and checked 
by this newly formed opposition party (Alexander, 2000:385; Raftopoulos, 2002:414).
32
  
It is also considered that the human rights situation in Zimbabwe has been seriously deteriorating 
since this election. Since its independence in 1980, Zimbabwean politics have been dominated 
by a so-called one-party or single-party system, and the ZANU-PF has maintained its 
dominance. Therefore, the emergence of the MDC posed a threat to the ZANU-PF. It was 
reported that there were a number of violent incidents targeting MDC supporters, especially 
during the series of elections in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008. Moreover, these elections were all 
regarded as not free and fair by the international community. Also at a continental and a regional 
level, the AU and SADC have tried to talk to President Mugabe to discuss this matter. However, 
he regarded these pressures as neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism, and ignored the criticism 
expressed by these external actors. 
Here, African countries were divided into two groups. On the one hand, countries that had 
liberation movement governments, such as Angola, Namibia and Tanzania, openly backed 
President Mugabe. On the other hand, the governments of Botswana, Malawi and Zambia have 
been openly critical towards the situation of Zimbabwe. South Africa and Mozambique have 
been privately critical, but reluctant to criticise the Mugabe regime openly (Human Science 
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 The parliament of Zimbabwe comprises 150 members of parliament (MPs) and the Speaker. The 150 MPs are 
chosen in four ways. Firstly, 120 MPs are elected by voters and they represent the 120 electoral constituencies. 
Secondly, the president appoints 12 non-constituency MPs. Thirdly, the president appoints 8 provincial governors 
and the National Council of Chiefs appoints 2 chiefs while the Provincial Committee of Chiefs elects 8. In this way, 
even though, the MDC won 57 seats, with the president appointing 30 MPs, the ZANU-PF ended up with 92 MPs 
out of the 150 seats and could maintain power (Makumbe, 2005:220). 
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Research Council, 2008:25). This split among neighbouring states at the regional level has not 
contributed to resolving the crisis of Zimbabwe for which collective action or a united voice is 
needed. 
Along with the political turmoil, the economic situation in Zimbabwe has worsened: one of the 
best examples was the astronomically high level of inflation rate, of up to 231,000,000% in 
2008. At that time, the Zimbabwean government‘s response to the inflation was simply to print 
more money, and this mismanagement aggravated the economic havoc (Soko and Balchin, 
2009:36-37). This economic disaster caused the dysfunction of society as a whole, and ordinary 
people have suffered greatly. A series of poor harvests furthermore led to serious food shortages 
and food insecurity in recent years. In 2008, a cholera outbreak swept across the country. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), by July 2009, 98,522 cases and 4,282 
deaths had been reported since August 2008 (WHO, 2010). These figures show that human 
security that guarantees basic or a minimum quality of life in Zimbabwe is poor. It also shows 
that the government cannot meet its responsibility to protect its people. 
Against this background, in this section, firstly, the focus will be on the background of 
Zimbabwe‘s human rights situation. It will be helpful to look at Zimbabwe‘s history to figure out 
the cause of the current political and economic chaos. Secondly, the responses of SADC and its 
member states will be discussed. Here, the theoretical framework applied in the previous chapter; 
that is, strategic calculation, role-playing and normative suasion, will also be applied. 
4-2. Background to the Issue of Zimbabwe 
4-2-1. Historical Background 
One of the main roots of the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe is considered to be the fact that 
President Mugabe does not want to step down from power and in order to maintain power his 
response to those who wish him to step down has been accompanied by violence.
33
 Here, the 
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 In the case of Zimbabwe, the reason for the human rights crisis is not conflict between neighbouring states or 
among militia groups. Regarding ethnicity, there have been reports of violence perpetrated by Shona, who make up 
82% of the population, towards Ndebele who make up 14% of the population. Nevertheless, there have been 
relatively fewer ethnic conflicts than in other countries (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:109). According to Tsvangirai 
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process by which President Mugabe seized power cannot be detached from the history of the 
struggle for independence.
34
 President Mugabe has been regarded as an important figure within 
the independence struggle, not only in Zimbabwe but also in the Southern African region. The 
perception that President Mugabe was against white minority rule in Rhodesia is still influencing 
the stances of the neighbouring countries. SADC leaders share a common history with President 
Mugabe, and the Front Line States were linked with strong ties during the liberation struggles, 
and thus it is difficult for these leaders to criticise President Mugabe‘s historical record 
(Rowlands, 1998:926).
35
 In this regard, it is crucial to look at first the history of colonialism in 
Zimbabwe. 
European exploration led by traders and missionaries started in the 1830s in this region. Cecil 
Rhodes‘ ambition to acquire diamond and gold accelerated the expansion of British colonialism. 
In the beginning, the present Zimbabwe was under the administration of Rhodes‘ British South 
Africa Company. In 1889, the British South Africa Company gained a British mandate to 
colonise what became Southern Rhodesia. However, in 1923, when the British South Africa 
Company was not able to make enough profit to maintain Southern Rhodesia, it lost 
administrative control over it. As a result, Britain annexed Southern Rhodesia (Bauer and Taylor, 
2005:173).  
In 1953, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland merged to form a single self-
governing colony. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this newly federated colony, had 
its own assembly and prime minister; however, there were no African indigenous politicians. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2003:132), the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe is not a racial issue between a black majority and a white minority 
either. 
34
 Here, if we wish to understand the history of Zimbabwe, the concept of Chimurenga cannot be overlooked. 
Chimurenga is a Shona word which means ―uprising‖ or ―resistance‖. This term was first used for the insurrections 
against British colonial rule in the 1890s. This is called the ―First Chimurenga‖. Then, the ―Second Chimurenga‖ 
was characterised as the guerrilla war or liberation war against the white minority regime between 1966 and 1980. 
Chimurenga was recently used to refer to the land reform in 2000. The Mugabe regime claimed that skewed social 
and economic structures in Zimbabwe had mainly been inherited as a colonial legacy and that this meant that a small 
minority of white farmers owned the majority of the country's land. In order to attempt to correct this injustice, the 
regime proclaimed a violent struggle for land reform, called the "Third Chimurenga" (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 
2008) 
35
 The Front Line States were formed in 1970, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe coordinated their responses against apartheid South Africa to end white minority rule (Bauer and Taylor, 
2005:5). 
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This federation existed until 1963 when Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (Nyasaland) 
gained independence. Southern Rhodesia‘s settlers resisted a transition to independence. The 
white minority government was afraid of yielding its rights to the black African majority. At that 
time, African nationalist groups, such as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by 
Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe 
emerged in Southern Rhodesia. These movements were banned by the minority rulers, but they 
survived underground (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:174-175). 
There was another political movement led by Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front which 
represented the white minority and advocated an independent Rhodesia governed by this group. 
Ian Smith repeatedly asked the British government to grant independence on the basis of white 
minority rule. In 1965, the Rhodesian Front declared independence under white minority rule 
unilaterally. This unilateral declaration of independence brought about international outrage and 
economic sanctions. Rhodesia did not receive official recognition from the international 
community. Moreover, the UN Security Council passed a resolution refusing any assistance to 
Rhodesia (Bauer and Taylor, 2005:175).  
Simultaneous with this external pressure, the Smith regime faced guerrilla wars within the 
country. In the 1970s these guerrilla wars against white rule intensified. Mugabe regarded the 
armed struggle as an essential part of the struggle for independence. At that time, Mugabe was 
supported by many African leaders such as Tanzania‘s Julius Nyerere, Zambia‘s Kenneth 
Kaunda, Mozambique‘s Samora Machel and Botswana‘s Seretse Khama. They all allowed 
guerrillas to use their territories as havens, which made it possible for Zimbabwean guerrillas to 
operate across the borders (Meredith, 2002:2). 
In 1978, the Smith regime yielded to pressure for a negotiated settlement with the black majority. 
However, at first the negotiating parties failed to reach a compromise and the war continued. 
Finally, in 1979 Britain mediated and brokered talks at Lancaster House in London, which led to 
a peace agreement and a new constitution that guaranteed minority rights. Elections were 
organised for February 1980, and the ZANU-PF won 57 of the 100 seats, while Rhodesian Front 
led by Ian Smith won 20 seats, and the Patriotic Front led by Joshua Nkomo gained 20 seats. 
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Mugabe therefore became the first Prime Minister of an independent Zimbabwe (Bauer and 
Taylor, 2005:176).  
In the process of struggling for independence and against minority rule, President Mugabe 
emerged as a significant leader and was respected by Zimbabweans and other Africans. This 
perception still exists in Southern African countries and makes leaders reluctant to attempt to 
resolve the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe (Klotz, 2004:11). 
4-2-2. The Authoritarian Regime and Its Oppressive Rules 
After independence, the Mugabe regime advocated principles such as nationalism, anti-
colonialism, anti-imperialism, egalitarianism, solidarity, non-intervention and non-interference, 
amongst others. These were inspired by the liberation struggle and are still influential concepts 
when making political and economic decisions (Chan and Patel, 2006:176). For example, the 
pursuit of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and egalitarianism were linked to the land reform 
programme in 2000 (see Section 4-2-3). The government labelled this land reform as a correction 
of ―historical injustices‖ and the ―fulfillment of liberation‖ for the black majority. However, in 
reality the process was corrupt and favoured President Mugabe and his supporters only (Chan 
and Patel, 2006:177). 
When President Mugabe started ruling, conflict between the ZANU and the ZAPU emerged. 
This rivalry was basically related to ethnic friction. The Shona, the majority of the population, 
supported the ZANU, and the ZAPU was supported by the Ndebele. The problem was that this 
minority, the Ndebele, was historically dominant.
36
 This brought about hostility between these 
two groups. Zimbabwe had had relatively few problems with ethnicity before. However, right 
after independence in 1982, a campaign was launched against the Ndebele population in 
Southern Zimbabwe. It was reported that Ndebele civilians were beaten, raped, detained and 
even killed by security forces (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:111). The government massacred 
upwards of 10,000 people in Matabeleland, where most Ndebele-speaking people live until 
Mugabe and Nkomo‘s power-sharing agreement was reached in 1988 (Minorities at Risk Project, 
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 The Shona were involved in the gold and ivory trade. As such, they could establish a strong Munhumutapa 
Empire in the 15th century, which subsequently split by the end of the century, with the southern part becoming the 
Urozwi Empire (currently part of modern-day Zimbabwe). However, this was destroyed by the Ndebele when they 
entered the Southern part of the country in the late 1830s (Davidson and Purohit, 2004). 
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2003).
37
 Since then, Zimbabwe has become a one-party state. At that time, Mugabe was 
proclaimed President and Nkomo became vice President until 1999. Like in other newly-born 
independent countries in Africa, this one-party system prevented the creation of a system in 
which another political party can monitor and check the abuse of power by the regime or the 
ruling party.  
In 2000, the ZANU-PF faced a new challenge: this was the creation of the opposition party, the 
MDC, which was founded in 1999. The MDC was formed as a form of coalition of civil society 
groups such as human rights activists, women‘s groups, church groups, and in particular the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). It was seen as a serious political threat to 
President Mugabe. Since then, there has been oppression and accompanying violence against the 
MDC and its supporters (Gruzd, 2005:16). 
Tsvangirai, the leader of the MDC, was arrested several times in the 2000s. Also, the MDC was 
considered as a puppet or spy of the West by the Mugabe regime (Prys, 2009:194). In fact, 
Tsvangirai does have close relationships with Western states, and his claims that assistance from 
Western states will be imperative in order to resolve the political and economic problems in 
Zimbabwe made the Mugabe regime increasingly suspicious. In the 2000 election, despite 
political repression from the government, the MDC won 47% of votes, and the result of the 
election showed public discontent with the Mugabe regime. Furthermore, by winning in the 
provinces that traditionally supported the ZANU-PF, the newly created MDC alarmed the 
Mugabe regime (Tsvangirai, 2003). 
In order to divert attention from this political issue, the Mugabe regime used the land reform 
question. President Mugabe enjoyed strong support from the countryside and considering that 
most of the black majority in Zimbabwe was landless, land reform could be used as an emotive 
issue with which the regime could manipulate public support (Hentz, 2004:153).  
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 This refers to the Gukurahundi, which means the suppression by Zimbabwe's fifth Brigade in the Ndebele regions, 
of mostly supporters of Joshua Nkomo. Mugabe, then Prime Minister, had signed an agreement with North Korea in 
1980 to have the North Korean military train a brigade of the Zimbabwean army. This Brigade committed serious 
atrocities against the civilian population. The violence ended after the ZANU and the ZAPU reached a unity 
agreement to form one party: the ZANU PF (Gretchen, 2005). 
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The Mugabe regime used various laws to maintain power. Firstly, the regime limited media 
freedom by enacting the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) to 
obstruct reporting about the situation in Zimbabwe. Journalists were threatened, attacked and 
arrested. Specifically, foreign journalists were considered as spies and forced to leave Zimbabwe 
(Davidson and Purohit, 2004:118).  
Regarding NGOs, in 2003 the government introduced a law, the Non-Governmental 
Organisations Bill, which stated that all NGOs should register. It has been claimed by Davidson 
and Purohit that this bill was passed in order for NGO activities to be monitored. At that time, 
the government linked the activities of NGOs and Western states, saying that this law would 
prevent foreign interests from using the NGOs to challenge the regime (Davidson and Purohit, 
2004:117).  
Another example of the repressive nature of the government is the enactment of the Public Order 
and Security Act (POSA) in 2002. In autocratic regimes, police power remains very closely tied 
to the maintenance of political power. Zimbabwe was not an exception in this regard, and the 
police were central to the Mugabe regime (Meredith, 2002:193). This law allowed the 
Zimbabwean police to arrest and keep in custody any people showing opposition to the ruling 
party and its policies, such as MDC supporters and human rights activists. Moreover, police 
permission was required to hold any kind of public meeting. The regime utilised the police, the 
secret police and army to circumvent criticism (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:116).  
Also, President Mugabe established a National Youth Training Programme in 2001. These young 
people were known as the ―green bombers‖ and served as the informal militia of the regime. In 
return for their services, they received jobs in the military and police forces. They were immune 
from persecution. It was reported that these green bombers were involved in many human rights 
violations. This has been condemned as one of the reasons aggravating the human rights 
situation in Zimbabwe (Hentz, 2004:153). In the same context, ―war veterans‖ were also 
criticised. Originally, those who fought during the liberation struggle became known as war 
veterans; however, subsequently they formed various groups to advance their own personal 
interests. One of the most prominent examples can be seen in the land reform process. Some of 
these people, having been promised land by the ZANU-PF, started occupying farms belonging to 
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white farmers, precipitating a high level of violence at the time (Davidson and Purohit, 
2004:112). 
The Mugabe regime ignored Supreme Court Orders as well (Peters-Berries, 2002:198). Judges, 
magistrates and lawyers who were supposed to protect the rule of law became targets of the 
government‘s oppression. If a lawyer‘s clients were related to the MDC, they were prevented 
from performing their tasks (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:119).  
From these examples, it can be seen that the Mugabe regime put much effort into maintaining the 
power of his party. In these circumstances, actors that should have monitored the current 
government, such as opposition parties, the media and NGOs could not function properly. 
Although western states claimed that they imposed only smart sanctions, these in fact affected all 
aspects of the economic sectors. This is regarded as economic sabotage, which lends legitimacy 
to the Mugabe regime. Thus, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism amongst others were used as 
tools to drum up support for the regime and make the opposition appear suspect. 
4-2-3. Economic Deterioration 
When Zimbabwe gained independence, its economic prospects looked promising. Also, a 
massive redistribution of social expenditure on health and education led to significant 
improvements in social indicators. In 1980, minimum wages were introduced, and regulations 
were introduced with restrictions on firing to secure job safety. As an attempt to redress 
inequities, the inexperienced government intensified direct controls and increased government 
expenditure. The excessive government controls and budget deficits became critical problems. 
As a result, government deficit rose to ten percent of the GDP. Later this spending on social 
security became very high and discouraged exports by raising the costs of inputs to exporters, 
leading to a shortage of the foreign exchange (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:110). In this context, 
the regime was caught in a dilemma between growth and equity. Later, a lack of funds hampered 
Zimbabwe‘s ability to import technology needed for transforming the country into a more value 
added economy. In addition, Zimbabwe's military involvement in the DRC's Civil War in 1998 is 
considered to have adversely affected the economy (Rupiya, 2002:257). At that time, more or 
less 11,000 Zimbabwean soldiers were dispatched to support President Laurent Kabila against 
rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda. In the middle of Zimbabwe's economic crisis, President 
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Mugabe is reported to have spent millions of dollars each month on the war. According to the 
BBC, Zimbabwe spent more than US$ 25 million a month and also lost US$200 million‘s worth 
of military equipment since its troops entered the DRC (―Mugabe's Costly Congo Venture‖, 
2000). 
Another reason for the economic deterioration, as already mentioned, was the uneven 
distribution of land and economic resources in the 2000s. This was not only a question of a white 
minority and black majority, but rather the way in which the land reform programme was 
conducted. The goal of this so-called fast-track solution was to accelerate both land acquisition 
and redistribution, targeting at least five million hectares of commercial land for resettlement.
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This fast-track land reform programme, which started in 2000 to 2002, resulted in serious human 
rights violations and contributed to a breakdown of the rule of law in the country. Despite the 
need for land reform, the process was accompanied by violence, such as assaults against those 
who resisted (Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
As a result of this land reform programme, the agricultural sector was crippled. Firstly, the 
programme resulted in a mass departure of white farmers. This exodus by those who controlled a 
large part of the economic power in Zimbabwe paralysed the economy as a whole. Traditionally, 
commercial agriculture run by large-scale white farmers provided foreign exchange and created 
more than 400,000 jobs (Peters-Berries, 2002:197).  
In addition, redistribution, the original aim of the land reform, was not conducted fairly. The land 
was mainly seized by groups of war veterans and other government-sponsored agents and the 
process was marked by violence and coercion. One of the examples was that in the course of 
redistribution, MDC supporters were excluded from receiving any land (Meredith, 2002:195).
 
After the distribution, problems such as a lack of infrastructure for farming remained. As a result, 
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 Immediately after independence, the new government sought to redress the inherited colonial legacy of racial 
inequalities in land distribution. However, no meaningful land reform programme could take place as under the 
Lancaster House Constitutional provisions the government was forced to acquire land on a ―willing seller willing 
buyer‖ basis. It was not possible to acquire enough land under these provisions. In order to resolve this problem, the 
government enacted several related laws such as the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. However, the process remained 
slow and the commercial farmers resisted. Also, internationally, especially the British, Tony Blair and the Labour 
government did not support this land reform programme. 
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agricultural productivity collapsed. This was directly linked to the revenue of the government. 
This generated a chronic budget deficit (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:112).  
Externally, this land reform resulted in international outrage and an unfavourable opinion. 
Britain, at that time the labour government led by Tony Blair, was protective of the interests of 
the white minority and insisted on land reform being based on market mechanisms, which was 
contrary to the policy pursued by the Mugabe regime. This different stance resulted in 
deteriorating relations between Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Britain, and the Mugabe regime. 
Later, it is said that Britain played an important role in the EU‘s decision to implement sanctions 
against the regime. Most Western donors, including the World Bank and the IMF, cut aid. Later, 
Britain also imposed ―smart sanctions‖ that included financial sanctions and travel bans for the 
regime, particularly the inner circle of President Mugabe, in the belief that smart sanctions would 
isolate the regime and target the private wealth of the regime (Taylor and Williams, 2002).  
The ongoing economic disorder caused by factors inside and outside Zimbabwe reached 
catastrophic levels. The decline of the country‘s agricultural sector resulted in food shortages; it 
was reported that 5.1 million people, approximately 45% of the total population, needed food aid 
by the end of 2008. This became more serious and 8.5 million people needed food supplies by 
March 2009. What is worse, the Mugabe regime used food as a tool to demand loyalty in rural 
areas. It permitted the distribution of maize, the main staple, in rural areas as part of its strategy 
to retain ZANU-PF‘s rural support base (Amnesty International, 2008:23).  
Under these circumstances, ordinary people‘s lives were in danger. The economic situation 
spawned other social problems. A prominent example is the collapse of the health care system. 
Infant mortality has doubled since 1990. It was reported that the population decreased by four 
million people between 2002 and 2006 already (AVERT, 2010).
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4-3. Strategic Calculation 
In response to the crisis in Zimbabwe, the international community used various means such as 
imposing sanctions and cutting down the volume of aid. However, there has been no visible 
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 AVERT, an international HIV and AIDS charitable organisation, notes that Zimbabwe is experiencing one of the 
harshest AIDS epidemics in the world (AVERT, 2010). 
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change in terms of the human rights crisis. Here, the role of neighbouring states in improving the 
situation in Zimbabwe grew more important. The response of SADC and its member states will 
be discussed against this backdrop. 
In this section, the focus will be on what kinds of rewards were given initially and what 
punishments meted out by SADC and its member states in order to resolve the human rights 
crisis in Zimbabwe. Since Zimbabwe was one of the founding member states of SADC, granting 
membership as a reward as was done in the case of Myanmar, could not be applied. It would be 
more appropriate to use strategic calculation, coupled with punishment such as suspension. The 
bottom line is, at the international level, sanctions were mainly imposed by Britain. The US, the 
EU, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the World Bank and the IMF have placed 
sanctions on Mugabe‘s regime. These did not however bring about the desired results that 
included the improvement of human rights records. 
4-3-1. The Self-interest of Neighbouring States  
There are sometimes obstacles to the process of socialisation. For example, the self-interest of 
neighbouring states can hamper the process. Because of self-interest the neighbouring states 
often remain silent rather than helping to resolve the human rights crisis even though it is 
obvious that the crisis in Zimbabwe has had a negative impact on SADC. This is seen in the case 
of Myanmar as well (see Section 3-3-1). It damaged the reputation and credibility of SADC. 
SADC was criticised for being unable to deal with a regional crisis concerning human rights 
(Peters-Berries, 2002:207). It also brought about negative economic consequences for some 
SADC member states with regard to foreign investment, foreign exchange and tourism, amongst 
others. Furthermore, the crisis in Zimbabwe negatively influenced the political stability in 
neighbouring countries which share its borders, such as Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa 
and Zambia. In the case of South Africa, increased illegal immigration into South Africa became 
a serious problem. This was directly linked to social problems such as xenophobia in 2008.
40
 The 
Zimbabwe crisis also damaged the political culture in member states of SADC because they were 
seen to accept this tyrannical state. Under these circumstances, deeper integration becomes more 
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 In 2008, a series of riots started in Johannesburg, targeting migrants from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. 
One of the main causes of the riots was competition for jobs. The incidents left 62 people dead and several hundred 
injured and resulted in the destruction of immigrant-owned property (BBC News, 2008).  
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difficult (Peters-Berries, 2002; Bauer and Taylor, 2005; Raftopoulos, 2002). These facts all show 
that there was clear reason for SADC and its member states to intervene in the situation. Then 
why did SADC and its member states maintain their unenthusiastic manner? It would seem as if 
not all members share the same values. That is, definitely, the promotion of human rights was 
not a top priority for Southern African countries (Nathan, 2006:617).  
Here, South Africa was under pressure internationally from Western states, other African 
countries and even nationally. Since 1994, human rights has been one of the important pillars of 
South Africa‘s foreign policy. After, the struggle against the apartheid system the struggle for 
democracy and respect for human rights became South Africa‘s foothold regarding its foreign 
policy. South Africa formulated these values as the fundamental essence of foreign policy 
―priority‖ (Alden and Le Pere, 2004:292). Against this backdrop, South Africa was expected to 
play a more active role in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe. Under this circumstance, when 
missions such as the Commonwealth troika were unsuccessful, South Africa‘s lukewarm manner 
was criticised (see Section 4-4-1). 
Tracing back the history, President Mandela took a strong stance against Nigeria‘s Sani Abacha 
and human rights abuses under Abacha‘s military dictatorship in 1995. At that time, President 
Mandela called for tougher measures including the expulsion of Nigeria from the 
Commonwealth and the imposition of an oil embargo. However, that brought about the isolation 
of South Africa on the African continent. It is said that this experience made President Mbeki 
careful (Habib, 2009:6). Raftopoulos (2002:415) writes that President Mbeki was sensitive 
regarding South Africa‘s role in the region and also wanted to avoid the position that President 
Mandela had taken on Nigeria, and which had led to a certain isolation of South Africa on the 
African continent. 
It is also said that South Africa pursued its own national economic interests during the 
Zimbabwe crisis. Lipton (2009:339) gives several examples. Firstly, South Africa was the 
winner when skilled and well-educated Zimbabwean professionals migrated to South Africa and 
helped to solve South Africa‘s human capital problem. Secondly, South African state and private 
companies could acquire many Zimbabwean companies with little effort. Massive amounts of 
South African capital flowed into Zimbabwe and South Africa took control of key sectors in 
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Zimbabwe such as food, agriculture and mining. Also, Soko and Balchin (2009:35) argue that 
the crisis in Zimbabwe created business opportunities for South African businessmen. There is a 
strong presence of South African business in Zimbabwe. Up to 60% of the companies listed on 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange are South African. Zimbabwe‘s trade dependency became 
heavily tilted towards South Africa. South Africa has become the principal source of Zimbabwe's 
imports. According to Soko and Balchin (2009:41), out of Zimbabwe's total global imports of 
US$1,966 billion in 2006, US$1,094 billion came from South Africa. Here, Alden (2010:6) 
provides another perspective. Since Zimbabwe was South Africa‘s largest trading partner in 
Africa under the Mbeki government, economic sanctions imposed by Western countries would 
also have negative economic consequences for South African business. These are some of the 
cited conflicting interests of South Africa in its policy towards Zimbabwe‘s political and 
economic crisis.  
There are several explanations for the muted reaction of other neighbouring countries. First of 
all, it is said that some member states wanted to influence the land transfer issues in their own 
states by supporting the Mugabe regime. This perspective influenced especially the other former 
British colonies of Malawi and Zambia in this region. For example, in Malawi, landless farmers 
considered the Zimbabwean land reform programme as a model that proved that violence could 
be justified (Prys, 2009:209). In fact, it is argued that Zimbabwe‘s land reform played a role in 
influencing an increasing number of cases of land encroachment and invasions of the tea and 
coffee growing districts in Malawi (Chinsinga, 2008). 
Secondly, some member states were afraid of the consequences of destabilisation or collapse in 
Zimbabwe. Furthermore it was said that some were afraid of a new outbreak of civil war in 
Zimbabwe (Chinsinga, 2008). If this happened, it might have had a huge impact on the Southern 
African region. Most countries in the region still suffer from political and economic instability. 
Therefore, they thought it important to support President Mugabe so that member states could 
avoid potential side effects of the crisis of Zimbabwe. For the above reasons, SADC member 
states were reluctant to put pressure on Mugabe.  
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4-3-2. Rewards and Punishments 
In the context of Zimbabwe, conditional aid which was urgently needed for the improvement of 
the Zimbabwean economy can be seen as one of the triggers of socialisation. The World Bank 
stopped financial support to Zimbabwe in 1999. Zimbabwe was suspended from access to IMF 
loans and structural adjustment programmes in 2000. Also, Zimbabwe‘s creditworthiness was 
downgraded by these international monetary institutions (Peters-Berries, 2002:208). Under these 
circumstances, South Africa used ―constructive engagement‖ which was the outcome of the 
negotiations between finance ministers and central bank governors from South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. It was expected that this could entice Zimbabwe into dialogue. This constructive 
engagement included an aid package of US$ 200-500 million in 2005. This package was 
conditional on a series of reforms and on new elections. However, South Africa's constructive 
engagement has been criticised by the West as a line of constant support for and defence of the 
Mugabe regime (Habib, 2009). Also, Zimbabwe rejected this and condemned the conditionality. 
Zimbabwe characterised this package as ransom and rejected the aid by criticising ―if South 
Africa wants to help us in good faith, fine, but if they try to hold us to ransom then we won‘t put 
up with that‖ (Prys, 2009:206). As in the case of Myanmar, the rewards which were expected to 
trigger socialisation in Zimbabwe, did not work well.  
Here, the Chinese support of the regime cannot be overlooked. As seen in Section 3-3-2, in the 
case of Myanmar sanctions were imposed in order to bring about political change. There was 
however no fruitful outcome because not only neighbouring states but also China maintained 
close relations with the regime aimed at trade and the acquisition of Myanmar‘s natural 
resources. China also supports Zimbabwe, is its second largest trading partner and its largest 
investor. Sanctions do not work because of this support. China supports the Mugabe regime not 
only economically but also diplomatically. China vetoed proposed sanctions against the Mugabe 
regime by the UN Security Council in 2008. This has been criticised by Western states and 
human rights activists as it weakens the commitment to the improvement of human rights in 
Zimbabwe (Reuters, 2010). 
As a form of punishment, at the 2002 Summit in Angola, President Mugabe was replaced as the 
deputy chairman of SADC. This was a sign of the region's discontent with President Mugabe's 
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policies. Member states also prevented him from assuming the chair the following year. 
However, in 2003, President Mugabe was elected to represent Southern Africa as one of the 
AU‘s five regional-chairpersons (Nathan, 2006:612). This happened despite the fact that political 
leaders in Southern Africa were aware of the human rights abuses committed by the government. 
This inconsistency was not helpful in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe. President Mugabe 
succeeded in gaining the support of African leaders from Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and 
Tanzania. Davidson and Purohit (2004:119) point out that this support was evident at the 
meeting of SADC where they discussed Zimbabwe‘s suspension from the Commonwealth in 
2003. Southern African foreign ministers agreed to urge Commonwealth members not to isolate 
Zimbabwe (―Please don‘t ban Zim‖, 2003). Under these circumstances, it was impossible to 
insist on an improvement of human rights in Zimbabwe while accepting the Mugabe regime as a 
member of SADC. 
4-4. Role-playing 
As explored above, the self-interest of neighbouring states contributed to the worsening situation. 
Both reward and punishment given to Zimbabwe at a regional level did not bear a fruitful result. 
In this section, it will be discussed what kind of environment was formed for actors to accept the 
new human rights norm. Checkel (2005:810) explains that when a state has a particular 
conception of a role, then that state can start role-playing because its actions are appropriate in a 
particular setting. Regional organisations can play an important role by providing an appropriate 
environment for member states. In this section, the focus will be on the factors that facilitate or 
hamper the creation of a favourable environment for resolving the human rights issue in 
Zimbabwe.  
4-4-1. Strong Historical Ties among SADC Member States 
In order to discuss an environment that can be favourable or unfavourable to resolving the 
human rights crisis in Zimbabwe, what cannot be overlooked are the strong historical ties which 
were formed between the liberation parties in Southern African countries during the colonial era. 
The leaders of countries like Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania share a profound 
understanding of colonialism and imperialism with President Mugabe. This has been a barrier to 
the improvement of the human rights situation in Zimbabwe (Alden and Le Pere, 2004:292).  
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Adolofo (2009:25) describes this split between SADC member states as Marxism versus Liberal 
democracy or liberation versus post-liberation. The liberation parties in SADC have Marxist-
oriented ideological origins. Meanwhile post-liberation states, for example, Botswana, have 
formally practised multi-party systems and held regular elections without violence. This is 
compatible with liberal democracy, and Adolofo sees this ideological difference as causing the 
divide in SADC. These resulted in dividing the SADC into two camps over the Zimbabwean 
issue. According to Adolfo (2009:24), this split between the liberation group and the post-
liberation group hampered SADC‘s pursuit of regional common goals such as socio-economic 
improvement and political integration. 
There are some other driving forces that must be understood in the historical context, for 
example anti-colonialism and a strong resistance against Western states. In 2002 the 
Commonwealth appointed a troika to resolve the situation in Zimbabwe. This troika comprised 
of the heads of South Africa, Nigeria and Australia. However, no agreement could be reached 
among these states. For example, the African countries, Nigeria and South Africa, accepted 
Zimbabwe‘s 2002 elections as ―free and fair‖. Unlike the US, the UK and the EU that criticised 
the election as unfair, an AU observer team labelled this election legitimate, free, and fair. 
Regarding this, the allegation has been made that this was a question of African sympathies and 
solidarity (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004:386). According to Graham (2006:123), President 
Mbeki was not comfortable with his position in the troika that was supposed to push the Mugabe 
regime into dialogue and persuade it to change its behaviour. It seems as if he was under pressure 
from the West, which was advocating strong pressure on the Mugabe regime, and African 
governments, emphasising the brotherhood derived from history. 
Prys (2009:208) argues that most Southern African states share resentment against Western 
states. They are likely to think that Western donors would like to influence their domestic 
development. They feel that Western states impose certain principles as a condition before they 
grant aid. This is an example of the general anti-Western perception that was prevailing in the 
Southern African region. In particular, these countries were strongly against the conditionality of 
aid given by Western donors. The former Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa, said ―we are 
tired of being lectured on democracy by the very countries which, under colonialism, either 
directly denied us the rights of free citizens, or were indifferent to our suffering and yearnings to 
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break free and be democratic‖ (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004:398). The former President, 
Bakili Muluzi, of Malawi also said that ―donors should not try to teach democracy to Malawians 
as the country was mature enough to know for itself what was good for it‖ (Peters-Berries, 
2002:210). Peters-Berries (2002:211) points out that this similar political cultural socialisation of 
the SADC member states adversely impacted on the resolution of the crisis of Zimbabwe. 
According to Leys and Tostensen (1982:52), the establishment of SADC in itself showed that the 
five Front Line states formed strong ties during the wars of liberation. This same experience 
created a feeling of solidarity which cannot be broken easily and which plays a role in the 
formation of their foreign policies. Tsvangirai criticises this attitude and calls it ―dubious African 
brotherhood‖ (Tsvangirai, 2003:131). This can be understood in the same context as Heyns and 
Stefiszyn‘s argument that colonialism created a sense of brotherhood or unity among different 
African states because they view themselves as victims of an alien, racist, and oppressive 
structure. Black solidarity, brotherhood and support for former comrades outweigh the need to 
ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights (Heyns and Stefiszyn, 2006:54). Graham 
(2006:121) criticises this tendency as ironical because these are among the very values for which 
the liberation parties fought.  
However, recently, SADC has taken stronger action against Zimbabwe. Since SADC has been 
criticised internationally because of the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe, SADC could have 
learnt something regarding the organisation‘s reputation. Furthermore, SADC could have started 
thinking about the organisation‘s common goal with regard to regional peace and security. At the 
Double Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government of the SADC, held in Maputo in 2010, 
the Chairperson of SADC, repeated SADC‘s commitment to finding a solution to the political 
and security challenges in Zimbabwe (SADC, 2010). Thus, it can be seen that the SADC has 
started the process of socialisation which is crucial for improving the situation of Zimbabwe 
despite the strong historical ties between leaders of liberation movements which have prevented 
human rights issues in Zimbabwe from being addressed. 
4-4-2. Lack of Activity by Local and Regional NGOs  
When the human rights situation worsened, NGOs in Zimbabwe looked for support within the 
region and from the international community. The Mugabe regime harshly criticised these NGOs 
70 
 
and called them ―puppets of the West‖. According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), when there is an 
oppressive regime and no means to improve the human rights situation, local NGOs, in this case 
Zimbabwean NGOs are likely to look for allies abroad. As already discussed in Section 4-2-2, 
the Mugabe regime introduced a Non-Governmental Organisations Bill in order to monitor the 
activities of NGOs which he accused of manipulation. In the end, most foreign NGOs that could 
form networks with local NGOs stopped their activities due to the political oppression in the 
country. Because of Zimbabwe‘s antagonism toward Western states, these NGOs‘ connection 
was cut (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:119). 
At a regional level, there was an attempt to improve the situation when the African Civil Society 
Consultation of Zimbabwe was held in Botswana in 2003. This provided information, ideas, 
experiences and strategies to human rights activists. This was the first time a broad range of 
regional civil societies gathered together and focused entirely on the crisis in Zimbabwe. 
Unfortunately, this effort was short-lived. The civil society organisations, except those in South 
Africa, were not strong enough to exert much influence. Therefore the hopes of activists could 
not be realised (Davidson and Purohit, 2004:124). 
Also, for NGOs and civil societies to exert influence, they need strong support from the public. 
For this, a strong middle class is necessary, but although a middle class is emerging in South 
Africa and Botswana, there is not much evidence of one in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa where 
the personal influence of political leaders is still the dominant force (Lipton 2009:341). Prys 
(2009:214) also argues that it is normal for leaders to debate behind close doors in the African 
political context, thereby excluding NGOs. For all these reasons NGOs failed to exert influence 
on the situation in Zimbabwe.  
4-4-3. Limitations of Legal Enforcement 
Over the past few decades, the African continent as a whole has seen the development of legal 
structures in terms of human rights. In 1981, the OAU adopted the ACHPR or the Banjul 
Charter. It was introduced to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in the 
African continent. The ACHPR was created as an instrument for ensuring that the member states 
observed the Banjul Charter. Later, when the AU replaced the OAU, the AU accepted that 
intervention is a necessary part of the commitment to human rights. This was hailed as a 
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revolutionary step in the history of human rights on the African continent. The AU formally 
recognised the right to intervene for humanitarian purposes (Nagengast, 2007:11; Williams, 
2007:256).  
It is also necessary to look at the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). NEPAD was launched in 2001, was a mandated 
initiative of the AU and the APRM was proposed as a key element of the NEPAD. The mandate 
of the APRM was ―to encourage conformity in regard to political, economic and corporate 
governance values, codes and standards, among African countries and the objectives in socio-
economic development within the NEPAD‖. However, the problem is that participation of the 
APRM is voluntary. In SADC, only Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, and 
Zambia took part (APRM, 2010). Zimbabwe and other neighbouring countries are not signatories 
to the APRM, and there is no mechanism to push Zimbabwe under the peer review system 
(Klotz, 2004:10).
41
  
At the regional level, in 1994, as soon as SADC was formed, a ministerial workshop called for 
the adoption of a SADC Human Rights Commission as well as for a SADC Bill of Rights. In 
1996, a SADC Human Rights Charter was drafted. In the course of the establishment of the 
SADC Tribunal in 1997, a panel of legal experts considered the possibility of separate human 
rights instruments such as a Protocol of Human Rights or a separate Southern African 
Convention on Human Rights. Many Human Rights-related provisions can be found within 
SADC‘s legal framework. However, Okafor (2004:421) argues that the Charter, the Commission 
and others in Southern Africa have all been assessed as ―weak and ineffectual‖. More 
specifically, as Davidson and Purohit (2004:109) point out, nothing has been effective in pushing 
the Zimbabwean government to end the violence and repression of its people. The truth of the 
matter was that when adopting these laws, it was imperative to accept human rights and ratify 
international norms in order to attain aid from Western donors. However, real practice and 
operation of these human rights laws were disregarded after gaining aid (Banda, 2006: 21). In 
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 This mechanism consists of five stages: Firstly, a background study and collection of information; secondly, an 
APRM Review team will visit the country to consult with the government and political entities; thirdly, the report 
will be prepared; and fourthly, the report is submitted to the participating state. Finally, the recommendation of the 
report is embedded at regional level (Kanbur, 2004:159).  
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terms of legal mechanisms, actually, Southern Africa adopted legal structures in terms of human 
rights earlier than Southeast Asia. However, the implementation did not take place. If a state fails 
to comply with a SADC tribunal decision, the failure will be referred to the Summit to take 
appropriate action. Furthermore, according to the SADC Treaty sanctions may be imposed on 
any member. However, the implementation that is so crucial to bring about change in Zimbabwe 
did not take place (Change Zimbabwe, 2009).  
Bekker (2007:157-158) points out factors that contributed to the failure of the legal framework 
on the African continent. He mentions institutional weakness, lack of funding, and the lack of 
independence of the commissioners, the inability to provide restoration to victims of human 
rights violations and the lack of follow-up in relation to decisions of the Commission. These 
mechanisms were unable to work and failed to provide a meaningful contribution to resolving 
the crisis in Zimbabwe. All in all, despite all the legal frameworks, there are no enforceable 
mechanisms that can check and monitor the crisis in Zimbabwe. 
4-5. A Breeze of Change? 
Even though President Mugabe still maintains power and pressure in the form of sanctions did 
not change the situation in Zimbabwe, it cannot be overlooked that numerous efforts were made 
at a regional level to create a favourable environment for improving the human rights situation in 
Zimbabwe. In 2001, a Zimbabwe Task Force was formed under the leadership of President 
Bakili Muluzi of Malawi, chairman of SADC. The Task Force team travelled to Zimbabwe and 
called for dialogue with the opposition and for the restoration of law and order. This was the first 
time in SADC‘s history that member states joined in publicly criticising another member state 
(Prys, 2009:204). 
In 2001, at the extraordinary SADC Summit held in Windhoek, member states tried to open 
channels of communication with the Mugabe regime. There was a series of high-level meetings 
and ordinary and extraordinary SADC summits. At that time, South Africa and Mozambique 
were actively involved in order to stop the situation from getting more serious. The SADC 
leaders repeatedly urged the Mugabe regime to respect the rule of law and human rights (Peters-
Berries, 2002:206). During the Extraordinary SADC Summit in Blantyre in Malawi, in 2002, 
member states called upon Zimbabwe to show respect for human rights, for freedom of opinion 
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and association and for the transfer of occupiers of non-designated farms to legally acquired land 
(SADC, 2002). However, Peters-Berries (2002:207) points out that most of the member states 
avoided criticising Zimbabwe openly. They chose to hide behind the multilateral position taken 
by SADC. 
In this situation, it should be noted that the former President of Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, 
criticised President Mugabe. President Mwanawasa was one of the first African leaders to 
publicly criticise the Mugabe regime (―Summit Bids to End Mugabe Impasse‖, 2008). Here, it 
should be noted that Botswana expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation in Zimbabwe and 
openly put pressure on the Mugabe regime by saying that President Mugabe should either open 
up Zimbabwe to reform or resign (Prys, 2009:214). Ian Khama, the President of Botswana, 
reportedly threatened to take action against Zimbabwe unless SADC took up a stronger stand. 
Namibia's former president, Sam Nujoma, was a loyal Mugabe supporter, but his successor, 
President Hifikepunye Pohamba, did not share the same sentiments (IRIN, 2008).
42
 It is 
observable that the stances of neighbouring states have slowly changed. It can also be seen that 
not all of the African member states of the Commonwealth supported the SADC‘s position. For 
example, Kenya and Ghana agreed with the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth 
(Abraham, 2004:161). Criticism, while generally ineffective on its own, could succeed if backed 
by African voices. Therefore, if this continental sentiment or concern is wider, it will be easier to 
improve the human rights situations in Zimbabwe. 
Recently, South Africa seems to be taking a tougher stand towards Zimbabwe as well. Since 
2009, under President Zuma‘s leadership, it is said that South Africa has sent different signals. 
Even when he was the President of the ANC in December 2007, Zuma already expressed the 
criticism that the Mugabe regime and President Mbeki‘s quiet diplomacy influenced the split 
over the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) (Human Sciences Research Council, 2008: 23). In 2004, the COSATU 
delegation was dispatched on a fact-finding mission. However, they were refused entrance. The 
strong criticism from COSATU sometimes causes conflict with not only the Zimbabwean 
government but also the ANC. The ANC criticised this plan as ―irresponsible‖. The South 
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 IRIN, which is part of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, provides humanitarian news 
and analysis about sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia (IRIN, 2010). 
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African government reacted to this by stating that Zimbabwe is a sovereign country with the 
right to take any action it wishes under its immigration laws. Especially, COSATU has voiced 
strong criticism toward the government in Zimbabwe, since the MDC is composed of 
predominantly trade unionists, that is ZCTU. This criticism can be understood in the context of 
strong bonds between the two trade unions movements (Meissner, 2005:15). 
Inside Zimbabwe, the MDC pursued a policy to mobilise regional and international support. 
Tsvangirai actively carried out regional lobbying. When Tsvangirai left Zimbabwe as an exile, in 
Botswana and in South Africa, he used personal relations to gain diplomatic support. It is said 
that to some extent, he has succeeded in winning regional sympathy within SADC member states 
such as Botswana, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia and in Kenya and Nigeria. Furthermore, in 
2008, he was invited, for the first time, to the SADC meeting in Zambia. This is significant in 
that it shows that he was accepted as a key player in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis by SADC 
member states (Human Sciences Research Council, 2008:15).  
Tsvangirai not only met with SADC leaders, he also had meetings with civil society 
organisations. Tsvangirai also met with AU leaders and other influential leaders in the West. 
Tsvangirai travelled to Europe where he had meetings with leaders in Sweden, the UK, the 
Netherlands and Norway. He also briefed the EU Secretariat in Brussels on the political situation 
in Zimbabwe. As a result, the MDC came to be seen as a ―viable alternative to the ZANU-PF‖ 
(Meissner, 2005:10-12). By gaining this symbolic status, Tsvangirai could gain support from 
abroad, and later the MDC could share power with the ZANU-PF after the 2008 election.  
Even though, the elections in Zimbabwe in 2008 were regarded as flawed, the SADC settlement, 
signed in September 2008, forced a power-sharing arrangement between the ZANU-PF and the 
MDC with a division of power. More specifically, Mugabe became President and chairperson of 
the Cabinet and Tsvangirai became Prime Minister and chairman of the Council of Ministers; 
they were supposed to share executive power. This was the most remarkable change in the 
history of Zimbabwe since President Mugabe was elected into power (Booysen, 2009:154).
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 Nevertheless, Alden (2010:7) argues that this SADC mediation in 2008 was tilted towards President Mugabe and 
forced Tsvangirai to accept the secondary role as prime minister. 
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In conclusion, at the moment, neighbouring countries which had strong ties with Zimbabwe 
which were formed throughout their history of liberation, are beginning to criticise the Mugabe 
regime. Various meetings have focused on the crisis of Zimbabwe and SADC has put effort into 
creating a favourable environment for actors to criticise the government of Zimbabwe. However, 
there is still a lack of active participation by NGOs due to the oppression of the regime and a 
lack of support from the public. Also, no effective legal framework at the regional and 
continental level can be imposed on the issue of Zimbabwe. Even though a SADC Human Rights 
Charter was drafted, the success of the APRM depends on the voluntary participation of the 
government concerned and on strong political will. Nevertheless it does seem as if a soft wind of 
change has begun to stir.
44
  
4-6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe was discussed. Many human rights 
violations took place because the Mugabe regime wanted to retain power. In the process of doing 
so, the regime used violent methods. During the series of elections since 2000, violence has been 
used against the opposition party and its supporters. Also, as a result of the process of pushing 
forward the land reform programme, and other reasons, national and international, the economy 
has rapidly deteriorated.  
Under these circumstances, the regional organisation and its member states initially showed a 
supportive attitude towards President Mugabe. These Southern African countries have shared a 
common history of colonialism and liberation struggle. Since most of them gained independence 
relatively recently, their sensitivity to the norm of non-intervention is strong. This made it 
difficult for neighbouring countries to criticise the Mugabe regime openly. Also, the self-interest 
of neighbouring countries formed an obstacle to resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe. For example, 
South Africa gained economic opportunities from the crisis in Zimbabwe and other countries 
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 This concept was borrowed from ―The Wind of Change‖ speech made by British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan to the Parliament of South Africa, in 1960 in Cape Town. ―The wind of change is blowing through this 
continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact‖. The speech was 
historically important. The speech implied that the British government intended to grant independence to its 
colonies. Subsequently, most of the British colonies in Africa became independent in the 1960s (―1960, Macmillan 
Speaks of 'Wind of Change' in Africa‖, 2010). 
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were afraid of negative political economic consequences in the aftermath of the collapse of 
Zimbabwe. Therefore these countries were slow to intervene. Recently, however, there seems to 
be a change in attitude.  
According to the report of Southern Africa Trust (2009), civil societies in the region recognise 
SADC as a key player with the potential to make or break the transition process. From recent 
statements, it is evident that the SADC is willing to take on this role. As Taylor and Williams 
(2002:564) argue, a mixture of diplomatic persuasion and pressure that encourages other states in 
Southern African to adopt more proactive and constructive policies may help to accelerate this 
process. 
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5. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to examine how certain regional organisations successfully socialise 
their member states into accepting human rights norms. In order to find answers, the cases of 
ASEAN and SADC regarding the human rights crises in Myanmar and Zimbabwe were 
examined. Myanmar and Zimbabwe both have dire human rights records. For example, 
Zimbabwe has experienced human rights abuses mainly because of the Mugabe regime‘s 
aspiration for long term power. In the case of Myanmar, ethnic factionalism is one of the major 
factors that resulted in brutal suppression by the military regime, and an attempt to integrate 
ethnic minorities into the dominant Burmese Buddhist society. Ethnic minorities chose armed 
struggle in response and the repression by the military regime became more violent. 
Simultaneously the economic situations in both countries deteriorated. Myanmar‘s series of anti-
governmental protests were initially transformed from people‘s discontent with the government‘s 
economic mismanagement such as demonetisation and the abrupt rise in the price of basic 
commodities. In 2008, Tropical Cyclone Nargis made the situation in Myanmar even worse by 
destroying the country‘s farmland, which brought about food shortages. Many people were 
exposed to serious human security problems in the aftermath of this natural disaster. In 
Zimbabwe, the excessive redistribution of land by the government had an adverse effect and led 
to a deficit. The land reform programme of 2000, conducted in the name of redress of historical 
injustice, led to a massive exodus of white farmers who had owned most of the land. As a result, 
Zimbabwe lost their skills and infrastructure. In contrast to the original stated intention, this land 
reform was conducted unfairly and most of land was given to those who support President 
Mugabe; also the process involved violence. Unfortunately international sanctions, the aim of 
which was to improve the human rights situations in both countries, ultimately made ordinary 
people‘s lives more difficult. Under these circumstances, basic rights, not only political and 
economic but also social, that is the right to access to basic education and healthcare, could not 
be provided by these two governments.  
Even though the background to the human rights abuses is different, both governments used 
violent methods to maintain their power and were heavily criticised by mainly Western states 
and international NGOs. These furthermore pressurised the regional organisations to which these 
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countries belong, ASEAN and SADC, to play important roles in improving and resolving the 
human rights situations in Myanmar and Zimbabwe. However, because of the non-intervention 
norm which was deeply rooted in these regions, improvement of the situations did not take place. 
However, recently, ASEAN has taken up a different stance by taking a series of strong actions 
against Myanmar. In 2006, when it was Myanmar‘s turn to chair the ASEAN meetings, member 
states united to block this and were successful. Furthermore, ASEAN adopted a legal framework 
in terms of human rights for the first time in the region, the AHRB. These events show that 
ASEAN member states are now likely to discuss and resolve the regional problems even though 
they are related to neighbouring countries‘ internal affairs. On the other hand, the SADC member 
states are still lukewarm regarding the Zimbabwean human rights crisis. These different stances 
became the starting point of this thesis, that is, why ASEAN has relaxed the long-embedded non-
intervention norm while SADC seems still to honour it.  
In order to address this question, the thesis focused on the process of socialisation looking at how 
the non-intervention norm has changed and how a human rights norm has evolved in these 
regions. Socialisation is defined as ―a process through which actors adopt norms, values, 
attitudes and behaviour which are preferred in a society‖ (Freedman and Freedman, 1981:258). 
There are three mechanisms that result in socialisation, namely strategic calculation, role-playing 
and normative suasion. Strategic calculation involves rewards or punishments. An actor is likely 
to consider what it can gain or try to avoid a punishment by complying with a new norm. 
Strategic calculation is based on actors‘ rationality; however, this calculation is important in the 
sense that strategic calculation can be the starting point of changing the behaviour of actors. 
Role-playing means creating environments in which actors can act properly. When role-playing 
takes place, what is important is intensive and long-term interaction between actors such as 
diplomats and nowadays the involvement of NGOs in the decision-making process. As a result 
of these procedures, normative suasion takes place; that is, actors adjust themselves in order to 
internalise and habitualise new norms. Thereafter, the actors take the new norms for granted. 
These mechanisms were applied in both cases (Myanmar/ASEAN and Zimbabwe/SADC) and 
the results are as follows.  
In the case of the ASEAN and Myanmar, membership to ASEAN was at first given to Myanmar 
as a reward. By granting membership to Myanmar, ASEAN and its member states expected to 
79 
 
induce Myanmar to improve its human rights situation. However, the government in Myanmar 
used the opportunities for maximising trade with ASEAN member states, and most importantly, 
the regime used this as a chance of legitimating the regime and protecting it from Western 
condemnation. However, when ASEAN blocked the regime‘s chairmanship of the organisation 
in 2006, the regime experienced strong resistance from the neighbouring states. This induced the 
regime in Myanmar to pledge to improve the situation in order to restore the relations with 
ASEAN and it established a new constitution in 2008 that prevents the military regime from 
interfering in the legislative process. Also, ASEAN adopted the AHRB, a human rights 
mechanism that can monitor and regulate regional human rights issues as a whole through active 
interaction among member states. These examples show that now the ASEAN discusses and 
intervenes in its member states‘ internal affairs and that the traditional norm of non-intervention 
has become more relaxed in this region. 
Zimbabwe was one of the original members of SADC, and therefore rewards such as granting 
membership could not be applied. In addition, other rewards such as aid packages and 
punishments like suspension from the Commonwealth and sanctions all failed to change the 
situation in Zimbabwe. Here, at the continental and regional level, a legal framework that could 
regulate human rights violations already existed, however these mechanisms failed to make a 
significant contribution to resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe. Also, it can be noted that SADC was 
divided in two camps, those who support the Mugabe regime (Angola, Namibia and Tanzania) 
and those who do not (Botswana, Malawi and Zambia). These all make it difficult to resolve the 
human rights situation in Zimbabwe. 
Through this comparative study, the finding is that the regional organisation‘s role is important 
in the process of socialisation, that is, in the acceptance of a new norm. It can provide an arena 
where actors can interact, communicate with each other, and through this process learn a new 
role. Also, what should be noted is that regional organisations, for example ASEAN, can interact 
with other international organisations such as the EU and other actors, states and NGOs. In the 
process it can be seen that the organisation is also socialised.  
Here, factors that contributed to creating favourable or unfavourable environments for these 
regional organisations‘ socialisation will now be discussed. First of all, this thesis suggests that 
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the difference between the stances of the two regional organisations cannot be detached from 
history and can be traced back to the process of gaining independence. This influenced the 
member states‘ relations. In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe and the Front Line states were involved 
in armed struggles against racist minority governments and colonial rule and this contributed to a 
sense of solidarity among liberation movements and the states they inherited. This still heavily 
influences these states and leads to their not wishing to criticise each other. In Southeast Asia, 
the experiences of gaining independence varied. Even though Vietnam‘s anti-colonial struggle 
was strong, in the case of Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore, anti-colonialism did not 
surface. Cambodia and Laos were under French rule, the French mixed direct and indirect rule, 
and did not focus on these two countries. Malaysia and Singapore were run by the British as a 
―showcase of benevolent foreign rule‖. Thailand could retain its independent status. It is said that 
only Vietnam and Indonesia resisted the colonial policies of discrimination and exploitation 
(SarDesai, 2003:204). As a result, these states did not have any shared common experience 
which could lead to the shaping of a common identity. Also, so-called Konfrontasi which means 
dispute and rivalry among countries in Southeast Asia, is strong. These historical backgrounds 
influenced the formation of these two regional organisations as well. In the case of SADC, the 
great cost of liberation brought about the solidarity of the region.  
Also, Lipton (2009:340) argues that African leaders are sympathetic towards President Mugabe. 
The situation in Myanmar is different. Actually, the junta initially had a close relationship with 
some political leaders in ASEAN member states such as with President Suharto in Indonesia and 
with the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mohammed Mahatir. After these old generation leaders 
stepped down from power, the junta lost support and Myanmar could no longer find political 
allies in the region. The advent of an upcoming new generation of political leaders in the SADC 
is having the same effect. It is said that Botswana and other countries with younger leaders such 
as Zambia, are now more willing to speak out on the issue of Zimbabwe (Hanson, 2008). 
Secondly, in the late 1990s, Southeast Asia became receptive to adopting the human rights norm 
because after the financial crisis in 1997. Even though the concept of Asian Values was prevalent 
in the early 1990s, it faced strong pressure from international organisations such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. Robinson (1996:89) points out that Southeast Asia has faced strong pressure 
from the West when it comes to human rights norms. For example, Southeast Asia relied heavily 
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on the US for its defence and for economic cooperation, and the US used the politics of 
―security‖ to push these states to adopt human rights norms. 
Also, Southeast Asian countries began to play an important role in international organisations. 
This forced these countries to conform to external norms. Here, to some extent, the rivalry 
between member states of ASEAN eventually contributed to the acceptance of these norms. 
ASEAN member states competitively adopted new norms to improve their reputations. On the 
other hand, in SADC, the region clearly emphasised anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-
apartheid values. In Southern Africa, the resistance to Western ideas has influenced their 
willingness to adopt the human rights norm. Also, there was no state that played the role of 
regional leader. Considering its political and economic influence in the region, South Africa was 
expected to do so, but the Mbeki regime preferred the so-called ―quiet diplomacy‖; it did not 
want to be isolated as a result of addressing such a sensitive issue in the region. It did not want to 
criticise a leader who had shared the experience of fighting for freedom from white minority rule 
and colonialism. 
Thirdly, in the realm of foreign policy, the personal influence of political leaders is significant. 
Nevertheless, in the process of interpreting and implementing external norms, various actors can 
be involved, including NGOs. In the case of Myanmar, the NGOs in the neighbouring countries 
actively discussed and embraced the new human rights norms. These various actors encouraged 
their own governments to pressurise the Myanmar regime. However, in the case of Zimbabwe, 
the participation of NGOs at the regional level is limited. The only NGOs with sufficient 
influence are those in South Africa. Here, the existence of a middle class is important as well. 
ASEAN member states have achieved a certain amount of economic development, and 
simultaneously the power of the middle class has increased. Moreover, this middle class is now 
aware of the human rights situation in their own countries and in neighbouring countries. In 
Southern Africa a middle class has emerged in South Africa and Botswana primarily. This 
difference has affected the ease with which a favourable environment for resolving the human 
rights crisis can be created. Here, the role of local, indigenous NGOs in Myanmar and Zimbabwe 
should not be overlooked. Even though the NGOs‘ connections with neighbouring states is 
important, it should be realised that there are strong internal voices in Zimbabwe. Even though it 
has limited power, the MDC, based on civil society, is now sharing power with the ruling 
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government, and the MDC is widely recognised as an alternative after the stepdown of President 
Mugabe. On the contrary, in the case of Myanmar, there is only a government in exile and the 
opposition party still faces barriers to participating in election campaigns. Also, ordinary 
people‘s political apathy in Myanmar resulting from the atmosphere of terror can be a barrier.  
Fourthly, SADC has been equipped with a good institutional framework regarding regional 
integration. For example, according to Nathan (2006:619), one of the SADC‘s founding 
documents noted that ―the envisaged process of integration would entail a shift in the locus of 
exercising sovereignty from the national to the regional level‖. Furthermore, in terms of human 
rights, already in 1996, the SADC secretariat foresaw that the organisation would be mandated to 
monitor the performance of member states in the field of human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law. However, during the finalisation of the Organisation‘s Protocol in 2000, this was 
excluded from the document. This shows that even though the regional organisation created an 
institutional form, without the consensus and normative congruence to accept it, this can be just 
hollow propaganda.  
When it comes to the acceptance of external norms such as human rights, the support of member 
states is necessary, here, the member state‘s level of democracy is important. If many states of 
these two regional organisations become liberal democracies, this will create a favourable 
environment which can bring about long-term outcomes of socialisation. Then target states can 
quickly and smoothly adopt fundamental liberal norms of state organisation and conduct, and do 
as others do. This outcome can be seen in the case of the EU and ex-communist Central and East 
European countries (Schimmelfennig, 2005:835-836). Schimmelfennig (2005:835-836) notes 
that ―if all major parties base their legitimacy claims and programs on liberal reform‖, the 
adaptation to democracy or human rights will be likely. This can be applied to states in these two 
regions as well. 
The Chinese support for these countries can serve as an important aspect affecting human rights 
issues in both regions. China is willing to provide economic aid to both regions and has already 
done so. This means that other countries who attempt to improve the human rights situations in 
these countries can lose important leverage as long as China provides these countries with 
economic and diplomatic support. For example, in the case of Myanmar, the military junta 
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visited China in September, 2010 to strengthen the relationship between them. China has already 
invested heavily in hydropower, oil and gas in Myanmar and rose to the third largest trading 
partner and investor after Thailand and Singapore in 2009 (―China Extends Welcome to Than 
Shwe‖, 2010). In the case of Zimbabwe, President Mugabe openly expressed his gratitude to 
China regarding its continuing economic and diplomatic support despite Western condemnation. 
In this thesis there was an attempt to answer the question why a certain regional organisation is 
successful in socialising a target state, while another is not. The favourable and unfavourable 
conditions which influenced this socialisation process were discussed by analysing the cases of 
ASEAN/Myanmar and SADC/Zimbabwe using the three mechanisms which can lead to 
socialisation. The bottom line is that ASEAN has become more accustomed to international 
principles, such as human rights norms while SADC is still intolerant of condemnation by the 
West. Furthermore, there are strong historical bonds between the leaders of the former liberation 
movements in Southern Africa. These bonds make leaders of other countries unwilling to 
criticise the human rights issue in Zimbabwe. This prevents the mechanisms of socialisation 
from working effectively.  
Here, it should be noted that the mechanisms of socialisation were derived from the experience 
of the EU. As already mentioned as a limitation, the socialisation process does not seem to 
consist simply of these three mechanisms. Also, it should not be overlooked that it takes a long 
time for people to internalise and habitualise human rights norms in everyday practice. 
Therefore, a more sophisticated and minute framework which can supplement and make up for 
the gaps between each mechanism should be developed. With regard to this, the unique regional 
characteristics such as the historical background, the level of democratisation, the level of 
integration and the effectiveness of regional organisations should be considered. 
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